IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

GALVESTON DIVISION

RALPH FIGGS § CASE NO. 3-11-CV-00306

§ GALVESTON, TEXAS

VERSUS § WEDNESDAY,

\$ DECEMBER 7, 2011 KIRBY CORPORATION, ET AL \$ 10:53 A.M. TO 12:44 P.M.

MOTION HEARING

BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOHN R. FROESCHNER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFF: FOR THE DEFENDANT: CASE MANAGER: COURT RECORDER:

SEE NEXT PAGE SEE NEXT PAGE SHEILA ANDERSON LORRAINE TREVIÑO

PREPARED BY:

JUDICIAL TRANSCRIBERS OF TEXAS, INC. P.O. Box 925675 Houston, Texas 77292 281-277-5325 (office) \Diamond 281-277-0946 (fax) www.judicialtranscribers.com

Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording, transcript produced by transcription service.

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff:

RICHARD J. BURCH, ESQ. Bruckner Burch, PLLC 8 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1500 Houston, Texas 77046 713-987-8788

MICHAEL A. JOSEPHSON, ESQ. Fibich, Hampton, LeeBron, Briggs and Josephson, LLP 1150 Bissonnet Houston, Texas 77005 713-751-0025

For the Defendants, KIRBY CORPORATION, KIRBY INLAND MARINE, LP JOHN BRIDGES BROWN, ESQ. Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak, and Stewart, PC 8117 Preston Road, Suite 500 Dallas, Texas 75225 214-987-3800

GALVESTON, TEXAS; WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 7, 2011; 10:53 A.M.

THE COURT: All right. Just for purposes of the record this is Galveston Civil Case 2011-306, Ralph Figgs versus Kirby.

Could I get appearances for the record?

MR. JOSEPHSON: Michael Josephson on behalf of the Plaintiffs.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BURCH: Rex Burch on behalf of the Plaintiffs.

THE COURT: Yes. Please, sit down.

MR. BROWN: John Brown for Defendants.

THE COURT: Okay. I've read the submissions, and I don't necessarily want you to just repeat everything that's in them, but I do have some questions I'm curious about. How are you going to prove that these guys -- really you need to prove to show that these guys should be getting overtime? Is that 20 percent rule going to be sort of dispositive?

MR. BURCH: Well, the 20 percent is the standard --

THE COURT: That's what I mean. Okay.

MR. BURCH: -- that the Fifth Circuit has applied, and so that will be the standard that's applicable. And the way that the Fifth Circuit has instructed us to apply that sort of lends itself to a class determination.

THE COURT: Right. Okay. I just wanted to make sure that I was on the page about that, because I'm concerned

```
1
       that Mr. Figgs' last three years he only worked 13 point
       something percent. If that's true, and I don't know if it's
3
       true and I'm not ready to say it's true --
4
                 MR. BURCH:
                            Right.
5
                 THE COURT: -- but if it were true, then he would
       not himself qualify for overtime. Correct?
6
7
                 MR. BURCH: If it were true, and it's not --
8
                 THE COURT: That's what I mean.
9
                 MR. BURCH: -- then, yes, he would not qualify for
10
       overtime --
11
                 THE COURT: Okay.
12
                            -- at least perhaps -- it depends on
                 MR. BURCH:
       how you interpret the Fifth Circuit's rule. There are cases
13
14
       from --
15
                 THE COURT: Well, that's why I asked.
16
                 MR. BURCH: -- Alabama, for example --
17
                 THE COURT: Sure.
18
                 MR. BURCH: -- that say if, for certain periods,
19
       for example for a several month period, even according to
20
       their analysis --
21
                 THE COURT: Sure.
22
                            -- Mr. Figgs was working more than
                 MR. BURCH:
23
       20 percent of his time unloading and loading, and, in fact,
24
       it's a several month period towards the end of his employment
25
       where even under their restricted definition of what
```

constitutes non-seamen's work, he's more than 20 percent.

But it would seem to me that that doesn't address the issue of whether or not class certification is appropriate, that addressed the issue of whether or not on the merits we win or lose.

THE COURT: Right. But what I'm saying is do we want to certify this thing if the suspicion is nobody's going to work 20 percent of the time in tankering.

MR. BURCH: Well, obviously if we thought that that was the case, we would not have brought this lawsuit.

THE COURT: Oh, I understand.

MR. BURCH: Right. But --

THE COURT: But now we've got at least some evidence from the Defendants saying, "We've gone through these logs, and I'm assuming the logs" -- at least my experience has been that those logs are kind of the bible on board ships and I wouldn't assume that they're tampered with, but assuming you could get your hands on the logs, and assuming again, which I think is probably true, at least for the last -- until these lawsuits started getting filed, they will indicate when tankering was going on, as opposed to just going up and down the river.

MR. BURCH: Well, that --

THE COURT: How else would you calculate the 20 percent? I mean if the records -- and the logs are --

let's say if the logs are reliable and if the logs indicate when they were doing tankering operations and when they were not, then -- I mean, is your client just coming in and basically saying, "I don't care what the logs say, I did more work than that," going to be enough evidence?

MR. BURCH: Well, it would be, obviously, under the standards set by our Circuit.

THE COURT: So it'd just be a cross-examination problem, like here are the records, the records show that you weren't doing it, but you're going to tell the jury that you did, and that's gets you there?

MR. BURCH: Well, the -- yes --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BURCH: -- it would. In fact, the Seventh Circuit said as much yesterday or the day before in a similar case. So the question here though is: What do these logs really show? And I understand that they are important documents, but if you look at what the regulations actually require them to show, the only thing that they would capture is the actual starting of the unloading --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. BURCH: -- and the ending of the unloading.

And none of the other tankermen duty -- or the other tankering duties that we consist -- contend are non-seamen's work would be captured. For example, the minding of the stove, the

taking care of the equipment that is used to load and unload, or the checking of the temperature of the stove to make sure that that's -- which is all done throughout the trip and would be added to the time both loading and unloading under this --

THE COURT: I thought that <u>Owens</u> case said that you don't count that stuff. Did I miss that? I thought it said you just have to focus on the loading and unloading, but if you're just monitoring the progress of the fuel or whatever it is you're loading during the navigating of the ship, I didn't think that counted, but am I wrong about that?

MR. BURCH: I think you are wrong about that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BURCH: At least that's my interpretation of it.

THE COURT: Yes, that's fine.

MR. BURCH: But --

THE COURT: I thought it said that's transportation problems as opposed to tankering and -- but I can look again,

I was just curious but --

MR. BURCH: Right. And if you look at how the Fifth Circuit said, "Look, how do we analyze this, you know, exemption?" And what you do is you look at the general duties that are performed by the employees most often in that position, and then you look at the primary purpose of the position that the employee is working in. And I don't know

```
1
       how you analyze a position other than on a class basis.
2
       Right? Because what we --
3
                 THE COURT: Right.
                 MR. BURCH: -- need to look at is what does this
4
5
       position do, where does this position fit within the
6
       company --
7
                 THE COURT: Well, but if we --
8
                 MR. BURCH: -- what's the primary purpose of it?
9
                 THE COURT: -- if I understand what you're saying,
10
       if we were to do that, and just because they're called
11
       "tankermen," we need to certify this class --
12
                 MR. BURCH:
                            No.
13
                 THE COURT: Okay. Because that's -- I mean they're
14
       called tankermen --
15
                 MR. BURCH: Sure.
16
                 THE COURT: -- there's the Defendant can say about
17
       that --
18
                 MR. BURCH: Right.
19
                 THE COURT: -- and that means they're in charge of
20
       tankering, or whatever it's called --
21
                 MR. BURCH: Right.
22
                            -- and while they're tankering perhaps
                 THE COURT:
23
       they should be getting overtime if they can reach whatever
24
       amount of time they're engaged in that, and then I guess after
25
       that you figure out what else is tankering, like does it mean
```

```
1
       from the second he starts getting the hoses to hook them up,
       till the second they come off, is that called tankering --
3
                 MR. BURCH:
                             Right.
4
                 THE COURT:
                            -- what else is included in tankering,
5
       I assume that's what you're saying, and you would like it to
6
       even be while they're just going up and down the river if
 7
       they're monitoring the cargo, that would be tankering as
8
       opposed to just the operation of the vessel.
9
                 MR. BURCH: Yes. When you look at the cases --
10
                 THE COURT: Which is what I thought the Owens case
11
       said, but I guess -- I'll just have to take a look at it
12
       again.
13
                 MR. BURCH:
                            Right. If you look at the cases, they
14
       call it minding the stove, I believe is the phrase --
15
                 THE COURT:
                             Yes.
16
                 MR. BURCH: -- that they use.
17
                 THE COURT:
                            Right.
18
                 MR. BURCH: And again, that is a merits question --
19
                 THE COURT: I understand that.
20
                 MR. BURCH: -- and not a class certification
21
       question.
22
                 THE COURT:
                            I understand that.
23
                 MR. BURCH: According to this --
24
                 THE COURT: But my -- where I'm going with it,
25
       obviously --
```

1 MR. BURCH: Sure. 2 -- is if we're going to certify it and THE COURT: 3 we find out that none of these guys work more than 10 percent 4 of their time doing tankering stuff, then we sure wasted a lot 5 of money and a lot of time, and, you know, doing that, as 6 opposed to sort of concentrating on whether -- let's say for 7 example Mr. Figgs could ever get a case to the jury based on 8 whatever evidence he's going to have, which means a 9 certification decision may get postponed a little bit while we 10 concentrate on who the Plaintiffs are in this case. 11 And I know you worry about the statute of 12 limitations running and that kind of thing, but these guys are 13 still not being paid overtime. Right? 14 MR. BURCH: That's true, although --15 THE COURT: So I mean they've got to --16 MR. BURCH: -- that doesn't help the people that 17 are former employees --18 THE COURT: Right. 19 MR. BURCH: -- it doesn't help the people who --THE COURT: Right. 20 21 MR. BURCH: -- are continuing to work. 22 THE COURT: Yes. 23 MR. BURCH: I mean their statute continues to be 24 what it is. And Blessey asked for exactly the same thing in

25

the <u>Blessey</u> case.

```
1
                 THE COURT: Yes, but they don't --
2
                 MR. BURCH: In fact, they filed a motion for summary
3
       judgment --
4
                 THE COURT: Yes.
5
                 MR. BURCH: -- saying there's no way that this
6
       guy -- I they think they had -- they even had a lower number
7
       under their interpretation of what constitutes seamen's
8
       duty --
9
                 THE COURT: Okay.
                 MR. BURCH: -- than does Kirby, for Mr. Figgs
10
11
       anyway.
12
                 THE COURT: Okay.
13
                 MR. BURCH: And Judge Atlas said, "Look, it's
14
       crystal clear that under the law of this Circuit and this
15
       District that the question of conditional certification
16
       doesn't turn on merits." Right? You may have a winner, you
17
       may have a loser. Right? But that's not the issue here.
18
                 THE COURT: I understand.
19
                 MR. BURCH: And the Courts have uniformly rejected
20
       the notion that, "Oh, you have to prove your case prior to
21
       getting conditional" --
22
                 THE COURT: Sure.
23
                 MR. BURCH: -- "certification."
24
                 THE COURT: And I understand that.
25
                 MR. BURCH: Right?
```

THE COURT: But some cases do say, But if it's going to be silly to do it, we shouldn't make everybody go through it.

And that's why I wondered where we fell on this 20 percent rule, and what ultimately is going to have to be proven for each of these tankermen to say, "I fall in the class." I mean, let's say for example, let's say you get --

class." I mean, let's say for example, let's say you get -we certify it and you get let's say 50 percent of the
tankermen join up --

MR. BURCH: That would be great, but --

THE COURT: Well, and then --

MR. BURCH: Yes.

THE COURT: -- they may just join because they say, "Wow, yes, I might get some money and it'd be great."

MR. BURCH: Right.

THE COURT: So they join, but then they come in and they take their deposition and you say, "Well, did you work 20 percent of the time doing tankering?"

And he says, "Heck, no, sometimes I didn't do any at all, I just went up and down the river, and then when I did, you know, maybe 5, 6 percent of my time."

It wasn't -- so what, does he just go out, does he not qualify for overtime because he didn't do enough tankering, and only those that do enough tankering qualify, or does he get to coattail in and say, "Well, I'm a tankerman.

1 It's nice that, you know, my buddy Al Smith does 50 percent 2 tankering, so I get to same overtime he gets even though I 3 don't do any tankering sometimes for two or three shifts." 4 MR. BURCH: Well, you --5 THE COURT: What do you do in a --6 MR. BURCH: -- could ask that question in the 7 reverse, too. I mean you could say, you know, what happens if 8 some guy works three weeks and during that three weeks he 9 happened to have a heavy period like Mr. Figgs did during the 10 last several months --11 THE COURT: Sure. 12 -- of his thing, does that guy get MR. BURCH: 13 overtime because of those few weeks? 14 THE COURT: Okay. 15 MR. BURCH: And, you know, maybe so, maybe not, 16 that's a common question that you will answer as a matter of 17 law for the class. Right? 18 THE COURT: Well, what's the answer to that 19 question? 20 MR. BURCH: It would seem to me that under the 21 quidance given by the Fifth Circuit, which is that you look at 22 the position, you look at what's the primary purpose of the 23 position and what do people most often do in that position, 24 and because it's a positional analysis, then that gives you

the answer. That guy was in a position that's primary purpose

25

```
1
       was to load or unload, so, yes, he gets overtime, or --
2
                 THE COURT: Even if he doesn't do it. I mean, let's
3
       say for six months -- he happens to pull a shift where he does
       maybe 5 percent of his time for six months is tankering, the
4
5
       rest is cooking and cleaning and maintenance and working on
       the engines and that canned type of work. I mean does he just
6
7
       get overtime for all those hours, even though he's really not
8
       doing what a tankerman does, he's just got the title?
9
                 MR. BURCH: Well, your argument would be a second
10
       stage, here's somebody who's not really --
11
                 THE COURT: No, I'm not trying to argue with you --
12
                 MR. BURCH: Sure. No, no. No, no --
13
                 THE COURT: -- I'm trying to figure out --
14
                 MR. BURCH: -- I appreciate this conversation.
15
                 THE COURT:
                              -- whether it makes sense to certify
16
            So I mean what do you think the answer to that is?
17
       that tankerman automatically get overtime?
18
                 MR. BURCH: My guess is that that guy isn't
19
       really -- and I apologize for informality there --
20
                 THE COURT:
                            No. No.
21
                            -- that that person isn't really
                 MR. BURCH:
22
       working as a tankerman. Right?
23
                 THE COURT:
                            Right.
24
                 MR. BURCH: That you have to show that the people
25
       are, in fact, working as a tankerman.
```

1 THE COURT: Well, but I mean he is a tankerman, and when called upon --3 MR. BURCH: The job --4 THE COURT: -- he'll do the tankering work, but he 5 just happens to be there when tankering doesn't need to be 6 done very much at all, and maybe let's not say none, but let's 7 say 10 percent of his time at the most is tankering, but 8 90 percent of the time is just doing regular seaman --9 able-bodied seaman's work. 10 MR. BURCH: That would be inconsistent with the job 11 description that Kirby had. 12 THE COURT: Sure. 13 MR. BURCH: At least prior to this lawsuit. Right? 14 THE COURT: Right. 15 MR. BURCH: What Kirby said that these guys do, 16 prior to getting sued for unpaid overtime. 17 THE COURT: Right. 18 MR. BURCH: Because if you look at their job 19 descriptions, again, prior to the lawsuit, they say, "What 20 your job as a tankerman is, is to load and unload cargo." 21 They defined tankering as the lack of unloading and loading --22 THE COURT: Sure. 23 -- of cargo. I mean that's the --MR. BURCH: 24 THE COURT: Right. 25 MR. BURCH: -- prior to this lawsuit that was

```
1
       indisputably the primary purpose. The fact that the Fifth
2
       Circuit what you look at --
3
                 THE COURT: Yes. Well --
4
                 MR. BURCH: -- for that position.
5
                 THE COURT: -- is the job description that was
6
       attached to the pleadings in here, the new job description
7
       that came out after this lawsuit got filed?
8
                 MR. BURCH:
                            No.
9
                 THE COURT: Okay. Because that -- it really says
10
       they're to prepare the ship for tankering operations, doesn't
11
       it? And then it also says they're going to also be deck
12
       hands, they're going to do all kinds of other work and -- I
13
       mean I've got it here somewhere, but --
14
                 MR. BURCH: Right. And the regulations --
15
                 THE COURT: Yes, here it is.
16
                 MR. BURCH: -- from the Department of Labor --
17
                 THE COURT: Yes.
18
                 MR. BURCH: -- obviously anticipate the fact that
19
       people who ride on the boats --
20
                 THE COURT: Sure.
21
                 MR. BURCH: -- may do some work, may even do a lot
22
       of work --
23
                 THE COURT: Absolutely.
24
                 MR. BURCH: -- that is seamen's type work.
25
                 THE COURT:
                            Right.
```

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. BURCH: I mean the Department of Labor says, Look, these guys gave you 80 percent of their time doing stuff that's unrelated to the loading and loading of cargo. But if they do more than 20 percent of their time doing loading or unloading, or if the primary purpose of that position, to use the Fifth Circuit's language --THE COURT: Yes. -- is the loading and unloading of MR. BURCH: cargo, then that position is non-exempt. Well, let me ask you this then --THE COURT: MR. BURCH: Yes. -- if I recall correctly, you first THE COURT: sign on as, what, a trainee, and then when you get enough experience you become a tankerman. Right? Isn't that it? MR. BURCH: Generally. THE COURT: And then after that you just go higher and higher and higher. But I mean like you're second rung on the ladder is a tankerman, so you have to qualify for becoming a tankerman, so as soon as you would become a tankerman, regardless of how little work you do as a tankerman, if you've got the title, you get the overtime? I mean, if you go that way? If you just say, "Well, it's" -- if you're

going to call them a tankerman and they've got responsibility

```
1
       to do this, then they're not a seaman anymore, they get
2
       overtime because -- you know where I'm going? Just because
3
       they're called a tankerman or they qualify for tankerman, will
       they be able to prevail in an FLSA case if they only, you
4
5
       know, work as a tankerman for 5 or 10 percent of their time?
6
                 MR. BURCH: Well, I think what you're asking me is,
7
       is a job title enough?
8
                 THE COURT: Right. And that's what it sounded like
9
       you were saying.
10
                 MR. BURCH:
                            No --
11
                 THE COURT: Okay.
12
                 MR. BURCH: -- I mean, it's clearly not.
13
                 THE COURT: That's what I thought.
14
                 MR. BURCH: You have to be doing what Kirby said you
15
       would be doing.
16
                 THE COURT:
                            Right.
17
                 MR. BURCH: Right? You have to be doing what Kirby
18
       says the job is.
19
                 THE COURT: And qualified to do it.
20
                 MR. BURCH: Right. And qualified to do it.
21
                 THE COURT:
                            Sure.
22
                 MR. BURCH:
                            Right. And if you look at what
23
       tankerman training is --
24
                 THE COURT: Sure.
25
                 MR. BURCH: -- tankerman training is focused on
```

```
1
       loading and unloading --
2
                 THE COURT: Right. But is --
3
                 MR. BURCH: -- and safe handling of the stuff.
4
       Right?
5
                 THE COURT:
                            But is the job description and the title
       the key, or is it the percentage of work you do as a tankerman
6
7
       that is tankering related?
8
                 MR. BURCH: Well, if you look at conditional
9
       certification cases, for example one of the ones they cite in
10
       their response to our motion for conditional certification,
11
       Aguirre (phonetic) from Judge Rosenthal, they make the point
12
       that at the conditional certification stage, and this is on
13
       page 14, at the conditional certification stage, if you
14
       relying on the job description, plus you have some evidence
15
       that that's actually what they do, then that's enough for a
16
       conditional certification.
17
                      And they say -- in Aguirre they denied
18
       certification --
19
                 THE COURT:
                            Right.
20
                 MR. BURCH: -- because they said," This is not a
21
       case in which the Plaintiffs rely on a job description to
22
       support certification as a collective action."
23
                 THE COURT:
                            Right.
24
                 MR. BURCH: This is a case --
25
                 THE COURT: I understand.
```

1 MR. BURCH: -- where we rely on the job 2 description --3 THE COURT: Yes. 4 MR. BURCH: -- to support conditional 5 certification. Right. I know. 6 THE COURT: 7 MR. BURCH: And at this point please understand, and I know you do, that we haven't had discovery. Right? 8 9 they can say whatever they want about other tankermen, and 10 until we can talk to those other tankermen and get their 11 points of view, we can't really respond to them. 12 THE COURT: Okav. 13 MR. BURCH: And that's part of the purpose for 14 allowing early certification and getting people in, so that we 15 can get a broad view of what is going on here, and so the 16 people who are having their rights determined, who are --17 because if you say this is seamen's work, this is not seamen's 18 work, that's going to affect every one of those guys. 19 THE COURT: Right. 20 MR. BURCH: Right? 21 THE COURT: Sure. 22 MR. BURCH: Regardless of whether they're in the 23 case or not. So they at least ought to have the opportunity 24 to be here so that they can chime in on that and they can give 25 you their perspective on it.

```
1
                 THE COURT: Okay.
                 MR. BURCH: And so --
3
                 THE COURT: And that's kind of why I was trying to
4
       get a feel for what ultimately -- and I'm not trying to judge
5
       the merits of the case, but what becomes a submissable case?
       I guess that's the easiest way to say it.
6
7
                 MR. BURCH: Right.
8
                 THE COURT: Whose case gets submitted to the jury
9
       and whose doesn't if we go to trial, and is it the 20 percent
       rule that gets you there, and if you're a -- regardless of
10
11
       whether you're a tankerman or not, if you can't reach the
12
       20 percent rule over the last three years, you don't get to
13
       the jury? I mean, is that basically where it is?
14
                 MR. BURCH: I think that on the merits --
15
                 THE COURT: On the merits, that's what I'm talking
16
       about.
17
                 MR. BURCH: -- on the merits.
18
                 THE COURT: Yes.
19
                 MR. BURCH: -- that the 20 percent rule will apply.
20
                 THE COURT:
                            Okay.
21
                            I mean, I don't see any --
                 MR. BURCH:
22
                 THE COURT:
                            Okay.
23
                 MR. BURCH: -- anyway around it.
24
                 THE COURT: So then what we'll have is we'll have
25
       some tankermen who get -- assuming they can cross the
```

1 20 percent threshold, those tankermen will get overtime and 2 the tankermen who don't cross it, don't. 3 MR. BURCH: And I hate to give you a lawyer 4 answer here, for lack of a better term --5 THE COURT: Well, no, you're a lawyer, I expect a 6 lawyer to answer. But I'm just trying to say --7 MR. BURCH: -- but the Fifth Circuit has told us, 8 Look, when you apply this 20 percent rule, don't do it in a 9 mechanical fashion, don't do it in a fashion that doesn't make 10 sense. 11 THE COURT: Okay. 12 MR. BURCH: Get a general sense for the position, 13 and they use the term "position," not employee, in fact, they 14 distinguish it from employee. 15 THE COURT: Yes. 16 Right? Look at the position, look at MR. BURCH: 17 the purpose, the primary purpose of the position, look at the 18 job functions of the position. Right? And then you -- and 19 can employees drop in and drop out if they're doing something 20 crazy, like you've got a guy that you've classified as a 21 tankerman, it says tankerman on his paycheck, but he's parking 22 cars. 23 THE COURT: Okay. 24 MR. BURCH: Right? 25 THE COURT: Yes.

1 MR. BURCH: That's his job, his job is to park cars 2 in the parking lot onshore --3 THE COURT: Yes. 4 MR. BURCH: -- is that guy going to be class 5 member? No, he's not. THE COURT: Sure, but this is a weird case 6 7 because -- I mean, it's not weird, it's kind of unique because 8 of the small number of crew members that go on each of these 9 barges. I mean, there's a -- there are two people that steer 10 it, and then there are two tankermen. Right? 11 MR. BURCH: I think that's the general --12 THE COURT: And there might be a trainee, but there 13 are two tankermen. 14 MR. BURCH: Right. 15 THE COURT: And as a consequence --16 MR. BURCH: It's only a five or six person --17 THE COURT: -- yes, they do everything from what I 18 understand, because even in the job description it talks about 19 the duty -- they do the duties of the deck hand and -- well, 20 it just goes on and on and it's got a bunch of stuff in there 21 that's not tankering work. If I'm looking at the right one, 22 the Kirby job description that looks like this? Yes, that's 23 it. 24 MR. BURCH: Yes. Okay. 25 THE COURT: I can see it.

MR. BURCH: Yes.

THE COURT: I mean, it's hard to read and I used a magnifying glass, that's why I'm having trouble reading it right now, but the second paragraph says they also perform the duties of a deck hand -- let's see -- well, whatever. Just leave it at that. I mean, a deck hand is a deck hand.

MR. BURCH: Sure.

THE COURT: We know what deck hands do, they tie lines, they make sure that the barges are together, they clean, they cook, they maintain the engines, they do all kinds of stuff.

But just to follow up on that, and then, well, while I'm thinking about it, what do you do -- what ultimately will occur if -- let's say only 10 percent of the tankermen employed by Kirby actually perform more than 20 percent of their jobs as tankering, and at the end of the day 90 percent of them don't even come close, does that rule you were talking about treating them commonly mean that the guys who really do a bunch of tankering don't get overtime because the other 90 percent drag them down?

MR. BURCH: Again, if you apply it the way the Fifth Circuit has said to apply it, that could be the result that you reach now.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BURCH: There is some tolerance because one of

the factors is, you know, what does the employee do in that position. Right? And just like you could say, "Okay, here's somebody who is parking cars out in the parking lot and he's so different from these other people, that he wouldn't be a seaman." Right?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. BURCH: So he would get overtime.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. BURCH: You could say, Okay, these 10 percent of the people, these people are doing something so different from what the normal position is, that they get overtime. Right?

THE COURT: Well, no, what I was saying is these are the tankermen that are actually doing a lot of tankering.

MR. BURCH: Right.

THE COURT: But there are only 10 percent of them that cross over the 20 percent threshold, the other 90 percent, you know, they don't, they do maybe 5 percent of their time, 10 percent max as tankermen.

Do you carve out -- do the 10 percent who are actually doing a bunch of tankering, as opposed to the other ones, get overtime, or does the 90 percent prevail so that we're saying, "Well, they may be called tankermen, but in truth, you know, only a few of them do enough to qualify for" --

MR. BURCH: They're actually deck hands.

1 THE COURT: -- "to get out of the exemption, the 2 seaman exemption, the rest clearly fall within it." So is 3 that a special class of tankermen who just are lucky enough 4 that they be -- they're on the barges that do a lot of 5 tankering, or what? 6 MR. BURCH: It would seem to me that if you had some 7 specified group of people who are like, "Here are people who 8 do a ton of tankering" --9 THE COURT: Well, they just happened to be --10 MR. BURCH: Right? 11 THE COURT: -- lucky for that three-year period, or 12 whatever it is. 13 MR. BURCH: Right. 14 THE COURT: I mean, they get assigned to this barge, 15 you know, they just happened to be assigned to the barges that do a lot of stops and tankering I guess. But, yes, I mean, 16 17 but do they drag the whole class down? Do they not get 18 overtime even though they deserve it, but nobody else does, 19 the other 90 percent don't? 20 And the reason I'm asking this --21 MR. BURCH: Right. 22 THE COURT: -- is because I want to get a feel for 23 that --24 MR. BURCH: Right. 25 THE COURT: -- because if we decide to certify the

1 class, does it make sense to ask these people to let us know 2 whether they feel as though they do enough tankering while 3 they're working to qualify for what would otherwise be, you 4 know, admission to the class. 5 MR. BURCH: Sure. And I --6 THE COURT: As opposed to just --7 MR. BURCH: -- actually thought about that 8 earlier --9 THE COURT: -- saying, "You're a tankerman, so 10 here." 11 -- when you mentioned it, like because MR. BURCH: 12 this is a self-selecting class, so to speak, people have to 13 affirmatively opt in --14 THE COURT: Right. 15 -- you could say, "Look, if you don't MR. BURCH: 16 think you unload and -- unload and do duties related to 17 loading and unloading and minding the stove more than 20 percent of your time, don't jump in." Right? 18 19 THE COURT: Right. 20 MR. BURCH: You could do that. And --21 THE COURT: Well, does it make sense to do that? 22 That's why I was trying to find out what the magic 20 percent 23 deal is. I mean, if that's what you have to get over, do we 24 just want to talk to the tankermen who think they do that and 25 see how many there are, or do we let them all come in only to

find out that they don't qualify, "So sorry, thanks for joining but you don't do enough tankering." You know, what do we do?

And then the question I've got I guess is: Do you get special tankermen who get the overtime and a bunch of tankermen who don't because they don't do enough tankering, which is I guess where I was just a minute ago. Do the 90 percent pull the 10 percent down ultimately?

MR. BURCH: To me, it seems like you're saying there is a group of employees -- there's one classification. Right? And we get to the end as a result of the opt ins and we've done the discovery and we find out that there's one group of employees who really does this, and then there's another group of employees that what they really do is something different.

THE COURT: Yes, it's not really -- that's not quite what I'm saying. It's just -- what I'm saying is there just happened to be some who, in the last whatever the relevant time period is, were assigned to barges where they happened to do a lot of tankering. It could be that the next year they'll be on the barge that doesn't do it.

So is that the end result, do you just -- do you have to treat each tankerman and each voyage differently depending on how much tankering that guy does and he either qualifies for overtime or he doesn't, or does he just not get it because there aren't enough people consistently getting

enough tankering done for the exception to fall by the wayside? Does that make sense? Okay.

MR. BURCH: I think it does.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BURCH: And, again, I think that because the Fifth Circuit has said you look at this thing on sort of a macro level, that you look at it -- but there is this tolerance for, you know, individual employees who may, for whatever reason, just do a ton of this, that, to me, would -- because you could have a deck hand. Right?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. BURCH: Let's say you have a deck hand who, for -- and he's classified as a deck hand, always has been classified as a deck hand, but for whatever reason he gets assigned to a vessel where the tankerman is a drunk. Right? And the guy never shows up for work, and so he's constantly doing tankermen duties. Right?

That guy, even though he's classified as a deck hand, if he's spending 50 percent of his time doing tankering duties for two years, that guy's going to get overtime.

Right? I mean, that's just how it's going to be. And so there's going to be some allowance for the individual situation.

But that's only within the context of the general rule, that the general rule is you look at the

```
1
       position, you look at the -- how it -- what the primary
2
       purpose of the position is and what it does.
3
                 THE COURT: But isn't -- yes.
4
                 MR. BURCH: And if the answer to those two questions
5
       are in the employee's favor, the employee wins, it seems to
6
       me.
7
                 THE COURT: Well, but here's -- okay. Let's just
8
       look at Kirby. Kirby's got, what, a barge --
9
                 MR. BURCH:
                            Right.
10
                            -- let's say three barges tied
                 THE COURT:
11
       together. What's the crew? The crew is the captain, somebody
12
       else who can steer the vessel and two tankermen. Right?
13
                 MR. BURCH: I think with --
14
                 THE COURT: There are no deck hands. The tankerman
15
       is a deck hand qualified guy, but he is now a tankerman, and
16
       they need the tankermen on the barge because of the uniqueness
17
       of what a barge does. Now --
18
                 MR. BURCH: I think they actually do have deck hands
19
       on some of them, but --
20
                 THE COURT: Do they? On some, or all?
21
                 MR. BURCH: On some, not all.
22
                 THE COURT: I was under the impression there were --
23
                 MR. BURCH: Not all.
24
                 THE COURT: -- just four --
25
                 MR. BURCH: Not all.
```

1 THE COURT: Okay. So --2 MR. BURCH: Not all. 3 THE COURT: Well, let's just talk about that for a 4 while, and I hate to keep you down here, but I don't want 5 to -- I want to do the right thing. 6 MR. BURCH: Right. 7 THE COURT: If that's the case, if there are just 8 two tankermen on there, then -- and there is no deck hand, 9 then I mean, that's it. He's just qualified to do the 10 tankering, but he also has to do the other work. So that's 11 kind of a -- that's a different world than what you're talking 12 about the Fifth Circuit's take a look at these positions all 13 over the place. I mean, because they aren't. There's just 14 two tankermen and then there's two people that steer the boat. 15 Right. But, again, the regulations MR. BURCH: 16 specifically address the employees who are going to -- because 17 they're riding with the boat, they're going to seamen's stuff. 18 THE COURT: Yes. 19 MR. BURCH: Right? 20 THE COURT: Right. Absolutely. 21 I mean, they absolutely address that. MR. BURCH: 22 And so what we have is we have a position, a shore tankerman, 23 that everybody agrees is non-exempt. Right? 24 THE COURT: Sure. 25 MR. BURCH: And they say, "Well, because this guy --

1 the vessel tankerman rides on the boat and does some seaman's 2 stuff" --3 THE COURT: Right. -- "he's non-exempt -- or he's exempt 4 MR. BURCH: 5 and he doesn't get overtime." THE COURT: 6 Right. 7 MR. BURCH: And the regulations, the Department of 8 Labor regulations tell us that that's not the case. They say, 9 "Look, when you have employees whose primary purpose is to 10 load and off load cargo." 11 THE COURT: Yes. MR. BURCH: Right? 12 THE COURT: Well, I guess --13 14 MR. BURCH: Even if they do some --15 THE COURT: -- maybe I'm stuck on something. 16 primary purpose of the barge is to take cargo from one place 17 to another, and obviously you have to have somebody who knows 18 how to unload it, somebody who knows how to load it. 19 MR. BURCH: Right. 20 THE COURT: But while it's going on its route from 21 one place to another, it's more important to have somebody who 22 knows how to make sure it doesn't run aground and make sure 23 that the engine works and does all -- cooks for everybody and 24 these guys happen -- because they're on the ship, I mean, I

guess the shore guys just work eight-hour days, I don't know,

25

1 but these guys, I mean, they're stuck on the boat so they've 2 got to do all this seaman stuff. 3 So is their primary purpose, so to speak, 4 really just loading and unloading cargo, or they just 5 qualified to do that in addition to what really becomes the 6 primary purpose and that is making sure these things don't 7 sink on their way here, making sure they're well maintained, 8 making sure they're tied together, making sure they keep a 9 look out, all those kinds of things that probably eat up more 10 time than just the tankering. 11 They just happened to be qualified to do the 12 tankering, which is the primary purpose when tankering is 13 being done. But the primary purpose when it's not is to just 14 make sure you get from one port to the next, isn't it? 15 MR. BURCH: Well, if you look at what the training 16 is for a tankerman. Right? The training to be a tankerman --17 THE COURT: Sure. 18 MR. BURCH: -- is handling cargo --19 THE COURT: Right. 20 MR. BURCH: -- in a variety of senses, loading and 21 unloading, as well as taking care of it during the trip. 22 THE COURT: Sure. 23

Judicial Transcribers of Texas, Inc.

Right? And if --

during the trip qualifies as tankerman or not, but --

THE COURT: Well, I don't know if taking care of it

MR. BURCH:

24

25

1 MR. BURCH: Right. But again, that would be -- if 2 you --3 THE COURT: Let's just assume it does. 4 MR. BURCH: -- rule that way. Right? 5 THE COURT: Well, no, let's just assume it does. 6 MR. BURCH: But either way. Right? Because they 7 all say it doesn't. Right? 8 THE COURT: Right. 9 MR. BURCH: Regardless of whether seaworthy or 10 maritime, you consider it to be dispositive or not. Right? 11 Or my case you consider to be dispositive or not, that'll be a 12 common question that will affect everybody. And the answer to 13 that question will affect everybody. 14 Well, sure. THE COURT: 15 MR. BURCH: That's not an individualized inquiry. That is a --16 17 THE COURT: But for today let's just assume it does. 18 MR. BURCH: Right. So that's a quintessential class 19 question. Right? 20 THE COURT: I assume so, yes. 21 MR. BURCH: Right. And so when you have a case that 22 presents primarily quintessential class questions. Right? 23 Like what constitutes seamen's work, it's a legal question 24 that's common to the clients, that case is appropriate for 25 conditional certification.

And, Judge, I know you asked me a question and I've talked myself away from it --

THE COURT: Oh, I don't -- I've asked you a bunch, I don't remember which one.

(General laughter.)

MR. BURCH: But, you know, let me just say that, again, everybody understands, the Department of Labor has understand -- understood since the '30s that people who are riding on the boat are going to do seamen's work. They may even do a lot of seamen's work.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. BURCH: Right?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. BURCH: But that doesn't change the fact that if your primary purpose is loading and unloading, and at least according to us, taking care of the load in the interim and related duties, taking care of the machines that you use to load and unload, and the hoses that you use to load and unload and all that good stuff, that that person is entitled to overtime.

And if you look at what these folks do, what they -- I mean, it's odd to me that they say, "Oh, this person is a tankerman, and a tankerman is somebody who's responsible for loading and unloading," and if they were on shore they'd be entitled to overtime, but because they ride on the boat --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. BURCH: -- and do some of the stuff that we've known since the '30s they were going to do in addition to their tankering duties --

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. BURCH: -- they're exempt, and that just is
backwards.

THE COURT: Well, let me -- but -- well, let me ask this: Suppose you're a tankerman, but you're on a huge ship that goes from, you know, all the way across the Pacific and then it loads up bunkers and then it comes back and it deposits the bunkers and loads up others, so it's in port let's say for two days, and you're the tankerman.

So when you're in port, your job is to tanker. So you're tankering and you're tankering here, but in the meantime when you're just out at sea with these things down in the bunkers and you're just cruising along for the 25 days of the voyage, you're really nothing but an able-bodied seaman who has a tankerman's license.

MR. BURCH: Uh-huh.

THE COURT: Now if that were the situation, would the fact that he's a tankerman mean he gets qualified for overtime? Because there are 30 other able-bodied seamen and he's just doing exactly what they do the rest of the time, but just for those two days on the 23-day voyage he's actually

```
1
       doing tankering work.
2
                 MR. BURCH: And I want to understand your
3
       hypothetical. In the interim he's not doing anything --
4
                 THE COURT: Right. In the interim he doesn't do
5
       anything --
6
                 MR. BURCH: -- like he gets loaded and it's
7
       perfect, he has no responsibility, it would seem to me that
8
       he's not, because that quy isn't really working as a
9
       tankerman.
10
                 THE COURT: But he's got the title --
11
                 MR. BURCH: He's got the --
12
                 THE COURT: -- and he's got the license --
13
                 MR. BURCH: He's got a title, but he's not really
14
       working as a tankerman.
15
                 THE COURT:
                            Right.
16
                 MR. BURCH: What he's really --
17
                 THE COURT: Well, he's working -- his primary
18
       purpose on board that ship is to be available to tanker.
19
       Right? If I heard what you were saying.
20
                 MR. BURCH: My understanding --
21
                            It's like because nobody else knows how
                 THE COURT:
22
       to do it. If he's not there, they don't know how to do it,
23
       unless they do it from shore. That's all I was asking.
24
                 MR. BURCH: Right. But that's -- yes, but --
25
                 THE COURT: Because, and the reason I'm asking that
```

is because Kirby is kind of unique because if I read what was said, they're weren't deck hands to do the other work. There are just two tankermen on there that take turns on shifts, I guess, at least on some of these barges, because I mean, what if it's just one barge or two barges? They don't need a whole bunch of people scurrying around. Isn't that what you said?

MR. BROWN: You are correct, Your Honor. That is a typical crew. You would have the tankermen, who are the only people that do deck hand duties --

THE COURT: And tankering.

MR. BROWN: -- and then you've got wheelhouse
personnel who --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. BROWN: -- can drive and steer.

THE COURT: That's what I thought you were saying. So it's kind of unique because the tankerman has to be a tankerman in order to be on the barge because they so have to do tankering work, but maybe 90 percent of the time that he's on the barge he's just doing able-bodied seaman work, depending on what qualifies for tankering and what doesn't. I mean, if he has to measure the thing to make sure it's not leaking and that's tankering, we'd have to figure that all out.

But I guess I'm still concerned about where, at the end of the day, this goes if it turns out that most of the

tankermen wouldn't qualify for duty of tankering business from the facts of the case.

MR. JOSEPHSON: Your Honor, if I could --

THE COURT: Yes. Sure.

MR. JOSEPHSON: -- address some of the things that
you said?

THE COURT: You bet.

 $\ensuremath{\mathsf{MR}}\xspace$. JOSEPHSON: And I'll try not to repeat what Mr. Burch has said --

THE COURT: No. That's fine.

MR. JOSEPHSON: -- but I think that it's important to look at how a person becomes a tankerman, what allows them to be a tankerman. And they have to meet very specific requirements from the Coast Guard in order to be a tankerman. And those specific requirements obligate them to perform duties while in transit. It's not a matter of they load it and discharge it and don't do anything else.

They're constantly performing tankerman-related duties that are not only a critical part of their job function through Kirby and an important part of what they're trained to do, but it's something that they are licensed to do that no other person is licensed to do. They have a legal obligation because of their mariner's license and their PIC certification as a tankerman, to constantly perform duties that are related to the safe transfer of cargo.

Deck hands can't do that. That's not their function. And I appreciate the Court's hypotheticals if someone was at sea for 25 days and didn't do anything else. But that's not the reality --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. JOSEPHSON: -- of the situation. I mean,
that's not how Kirby does business. Most of these people are
in the Gulf Coast.

THE COURT: Sure. But what I was saying is if you take that approach, like, well, he's qualified to do this, therefore he should get -- we've got -- you got to take Kirby as what it is, and that is it doesn't have any other deck hands, it just has two tankermen because it doesn't need -- so really the majority of their work isn't tankering, regardless of the license and responsibilities that they have.

MR. JOSEPHSON: But it is tankering because it relates to the safe transfer of the cargo, and that's going back to a point that Mr. Burch made in response to one of your questions very early on. You have the ability to make determinations as to the characterization of certain duties that affect the entire class.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. JOSEPHSON: I mean, you can look at -- for instance I mean, just if you look at 46 CFR Part 13, look at exactly what it is that an individual has to be qualified to

do in order to have their tankerman license. I mean, there are 13 things --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. JOSEPHSON: -- that these people do on a regular basis in order to be a tankerman. This doesn't even take into consideration all the things that they're obligated to do through the Coast Guard in order to ensure that the cargo is shipped safely, or the things that they're obligated to do for Kirby to ensure that the cargo is shipped safely. Those are not duties that Kirby expects anybody but tankermen to perform.

And I think that's critical when you go back and you look at the guidance that the Fifth Circuit has given us, and you look at the regulations that are applicable to this position, you have to look at the primary purpose and the reason that Kirby has tankermen on all these vessels is because there is no one else that has the ability to perform these tankermen duties.

And courts and the Department of Labor have consistently said, "If you are doing these duties and you are doing them more than 20 percent of your time, you're owed overtime." And that's how we go back and look at the primary objective of it. I mean, you -- Kirby cannot do what it does without people that are employed as tankermen performing these types of tankering duties on a regular basis.

They have limited their analysis to loading and discharging, but the analysis is so much broader because there's so many other functions that we've identified in our declaration for purposes of meeting these conditional certification standards that are duties that are tankering duties that are not performed by any other employee, and they are performed for the sole purpose of ensuring the safe cargo — the safe transfer of the cargo from one port to another.

And I don't think that there is anything in the briefs that I've seen, or anything in the case law that I've seen that precludes this Court from conditionally certifying this class based on this uniform corporate practice of treating tankermen as exempt employees regardless of the fact that the Coast Guard and Kirby requires these individuals to perform duties that are, as a matter of law, tankering duties that no one else can perform regardless of who's on the vessel.

If there's deck hands or not deck hands, these are the only people that can perform these duties, and the duties, if they are doing their job, if Kirby is complying with the Coast Guard requirements, if the tankermen are complying with their licensing requirements in following Kirby's instructions, step-by-step instructions, checklists that tell them exactly what they have to do as a tankerman,

not a deck hand, then it is a case that is appropriate for class treatment.

It is a case that allows Your Honor to come -at the end of the case, once we know who wants to participate,
once we've done the discovery we're entitled to do before a
Court makes a merits determination, it is the exact kind of
case that Your Honor can look at and say, "Look, if you're
doing your job the way Kirby says you've got to do it, the way
the Coast Guard says you've got to do it, these cannot, as a
matter of law, be exempt functions."

You may reach the opposite conclusion, but the fact of the matter is if everybody is abiding by the applicable laws governing tankermen, this Court has the ability to make a legal determination as to whether those duties qualify as tankering duties or traditional seamen duties.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. JOSEPHSON: And that's where I think the analysis stops for purposes of today because we've met all of the other standards that the Southern District routinely follows and courts throughout the country follow in making a determination about conditional certification.

THE COURT: But that starts -- that takes me right back to where it was when I hit the door, and that is how important is the 20 percent rule?

MR. JOSEPHSON: Well, I think it's obviously important, like Mr. Burch said, but I think what is equally important for purposes of evaluating whether this case can proceed collectively, if we're going to look at -- if we're going to look forward and see, well, what happens at the second stage and how does this case get tried, you are ultimately able to look at the primary purpose of the functions that these individuals perform --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. JOSEPHSON: -- and make a determination whether or not that position, based on what Kirby says, based on what the Coast Guard says, based on what the opt ins say who self-select to participate in this case, whether those duties are truly tankermen duties.

THE COURT: I'm not --

MR. JOSEPHSON: And if you -- Your Honor, the other point I'd make, and I'm not trying to avoid your question, but if you just look at the limited snapshot that Kirby gave you in attempt to defeat certification, just relying on the captain's logs -- even though nothing in the CFRs require the captains to actually log all of the different tankering activities that Kirby requires its employees to perform, I mean, they could stipulate to that, that's -- as a matter of law, the CFRs do not require the captains to log those activities -- if you just look at the information that they

hand-picked in their own analysis, using the methodology that we take issue with, you still have employees that spend more than 20 percent of their time just loading and discharging without even taking into consideration all the other things these people have to do as a tankerman.

And that, to me, is the most telling. It not only tells you that there's a way to analyze the evidence to make a determination at the end of the day, but it should also tell the Court that there are people out there with legitimate claims who are working 84 hours a week and not getting paid any overtime as a result of a corporate policy that Kirby has had in place that treats these employees as exempt regardless of the nature of their job or the purpose for which it exists or the fact that they have to, as a matter of law, perform duties that are without a doubt tankering duties that could only be performed by tankermen who hold a license who Kirby has deemed to be qualified to perform these duties, who are trained to perform these duties, and that have to complete these checklists every single day.

THE COURT: Okay. But what if the facts turn out to be that, even if everything you say is true, that turns out to be less than 20 percent of the time they spend on the barge and the rest of the time they spend on the barge, let's say 90 percent of their time is just doing regular able-bodied seamen and deck hand works, do they qualify?

1 MR. JOSEPHSON: I think that if the Court makes a determination --3 THE COURT: I'm not even talking about a 4 determination. I'm just saying does the 20 percent rule 5 exempt -- I mean, do certain people not get it because they're 6 not performing up to the 20 percent standard, and those that 7 are, do get it? 8 MR. JOSEPHSON: If Your Honor will let me answer 9 that question --10 THE COURT: Sure. 11 MR. JOSEPHSON: -- in a little bit of an indirect 12 way --13 THE COURT: Sure. 14 MR. JOSEPHSON: -- I'll get there --15 THE COURT: No, that's fine. 16 -- but just because -- and I think MR. JOSEPHSON: 17 Mr. Burch and I may be some of the only people, I know 18 Mr. Brown's tried one of these cases, too, but not a lot of 19 collective actions get tried, and there's a lot of different 20 reasons for that. 21 THE COURT: Whatever. 22 MR. JOSEPHSON: But having tried these cases, and 23 having litigated how they get tried for a long, long time, 24 including cases against Mr. Brown, the Court is never, ever 25 going to be called upon to make an individualized analysis of

what people spend their time doing on a week-by-week basis.

And not only is there well settled FLSA jurisprudence that says that's not the right approach to trying these cases, but the Fifth Circuit has given us quidance that that type of approach is inappropriate here.

So fast forward, Your Honor allows us to notify these people that the clock is ticking, that their claims are running, that they have to participate if they want to get their back wages, we go through the discovery process. At some point in time Your Honor is going to be asked to make a determination as to how the parties are going to present evidence.

They have the burden of proof, we've got the burden of proof on some things. Most courts look at a sampling --

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. JOSEPHSON: -- they look at a sampling in a random way. Mr. Brown and I did that in a case in South Carolina where we had 3,000-plus people in the case and the Court ordered us to take, I believe it was a 10 percent sample through random selection. Mr. Brown got on the -- used a computer program that randomly selected these people and those were the people that were going to present -- do depositions or answer discovery.

That type of approach, whether it's random,

whether there's a statistician involved that tells you how to pick people, whatever it is, when the parties pick the people that they think are good representatives, at some point in time the Court is going to have a body of evidence before it that we'll probably say is representative of the fact that if you look at the position as a whole and you look at the expectations of the company, the particular purpose for which the tankerman position exists, suggests that it's a non-exempt job.

And what you're going to hear Kirby say and with that you've got Mr. Crow (phonetic) here who represents enterprise, and we'll have him here soon on our case.

Whatever the case may be both sides are going to present you with evidence that they think is representative of the class. And from that evidence you're going to be able to make very logical inferences as to what the nature of the particular position is and what its primary purpose is.

THE COURT: Well, let me ask you this, it's the same question I asked Mr. Burch a while back, and that is: Suppose the evidence at the end of the day shows that only 10 percent of these tankermen engage in enough tankering to get past the 20 percent line. Ninety percent don't. Don't even come close because of the voyages they happen to be on and that kind of thing.

Does the fact that the 10 percent are not

seamen and they get -- they would otherwise qualify for overtime, does that drag the other 90 percent into the overtime class, or do you just say, "Sorry, there aren't enough of you that do enough of it, so you don't get the overtime because we have to have the same decision apply to everybody?"

MR. JOSEPHSON: Your Honor, I will tell this, and this is coming from a lot of experience in litigating this particular issue, you will never have to make a determination as to whether or not a class consists of 10 percent of the people that are qualified to make a claim and you got 90 percent that don't because you will have decertified that case. You will have broken it up and you will forced us to file individual claims on behalf of all these people that believe that they have meritorious claims. You'll never get there.

You're going to be asked to make a determination at the second stage whether or not the case can even proceed collectively. And if there -- if the facts reveal -- and I tell everybody this, Mr. Carter, Mr. Brown, everybody, if the Court looks at the evidence and makes a determination that these people are so individualized, that you have such disparity within the putative class, I'll agree to decertify it.

THE COURT: Well, it's not --

MR. JOSEPHSON: And I will bring individual claims and we can litigate each one.

THE COURT: Well, it's not that so much as what the true facts of these cases -- because let's say it's 50-50, let's say 50 percent of them do it and 50 percent never do.

MR. JOSEPHSON: Sure.

THE COURT: Does that 50 percent get overtime, even though it doesn't do the -- doesn't pass the 20 percent limit? That's why I asked when I first came out, how important is this 20 percent limit going to be ultimately if this case has to go to trial? Do we just throw it out because of the uniqueness of tankermen on the kind of barges we've got here, or does it really have some significance if they're just a crew of two people that steer the boat and two tankermen?

MR. JOSEPHSON: I think that Mr. Burch said it best when he said you have to look at it from a macro perspective. Okay.

THE COURT: And so we don't -- when we don't look at it from the 20 percent rule, it's insignificant?

MR. JOSEPHSON: You've got to look at the nature of the duties and I think that, you know, we're all bound by what the Fifth Circuit says, and in <u>Sea River</u> I mean, it says it's the nature of the work the employee most often performs in his particular position and the primary purpose of the position that the employee occupies. That's the determination --

THE COURT: But doesn't most often mean just what it says, don't we have to look at what he most often does as opposed to just because he's a tankerman?

MR. JOSEPHSON: But you put it -- if he is a tankerman and he works for Kirby and he's got a license, he is doing these duties more than 20 percent of the time.

THE COURT: Well, we don't know that.

MR. JOSEPHSON: Using the Defendant's own narrow view of what -- how you calculate the 20 percent using the captain's logs and nothing else --

THE COURT: No, I'm not even --

MR. JOSEPHSON: -- those people are there.

THE COURT: Well, my question is, is what if, in fact, the evidence is that they're not doing that tankering, or even if we give you the benefit of the doubt and every time they do something that relates to the cargo, as opposed to just to the maintenance of the vessel, that still comes short of the 20 percent line.

MR. JOSEPHSON: I think the difference, Your Honor, using what you just said, because I think you raised a great point and neither of us have talked about it, you are getting into the damages aspect of the case. And it is conceivable in these kinds of cases that you have people that would, in a particular week, not qualify for the exemption. I mean, that's conceivable in every single FLSA case regardless of

whether it's misclassification or an off-the-clock unpaid overtime case.

That determination isn't something that you look at at the first stage --

THE COURT: No, I'm just trying to figure out whether this -- when the statute would apply and when it wouldn't, and if it applies to every tankerman that works for Kirby, or just some tankermen, and if the evidence comes out where only half of them would otherwise qualify under the 20 percent test and half of them routinely do not qualify under the test, does FLSA apply or doesn't it apply.

MR. JOSEPHSON: At what point in the proceeding do you get to that analysis?

THE COURT: I'm just saying let's say we try the case and in the middle of the case it's like, you know, the best I can say is half of them make it, half of them wouldn't.

Does the statute apply or doesn't it apply?

MR. JOSEPHSON: Well, I mean, if you rule that they -- that it doesn't apply to half of them, then it wouldn't apply to half of them. But --

THE COURT: Well, that's what I'm saying. But it would apply to the other half who just happened to be assigned to those voyages who the next year may get the voyages where they're not doing the tankering work?

MR. JOSEPHSON: But you have to remember, Your

Honor, that if these cases, if they make it to trial in a collective action context, it's because the Court has made a determination that these people are similarly situated in the case to proceed collectively, which means that --

THE COURT: Well, let's not say trial. I mean, let's back up and say once the discovery is closed and we're looking at the decertification motion and the evidence just shows that half of them do and half of them don't, do we decertify because the statute doesn't apply at that time because you haven't reached a preponderance of the evidence, or do we say -- you know, what do we do? Does the statute fall out at that point in time, or does the statute stay in?

MR. JOSEPHSON: There are so many different avenues available to the Court in that situation --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. JOSEPHSON: -- that it's almost impossible for me to answer. I can tell you that no Defendant in these cases is permitted to conduct individualized analysis, absent some court ignoring pretty well settled jurisprudence on what the appropriate approach to discovery is --

THE COURT: Well, let me --

MR. JOSEPHSON: -- which is done on --

THE COURT: -- let's say this --

MR. JOSEPHSON: -- a representative basis.

THE COURT: -- suppose we go ahead and grant your

```
1
       motion, now how many Plaintiffs are involved in this now,
2
       maybe eight or nine?
3
                 MR. BURCH:
                             Three.
4
                 MR. JOSEPHSON: We've got three --
5
                 THE COURT: Just three? Okay.
6
                 MR. JOSEPHSON: -- three, yes, which is significant
7
       for these cases --
8
                 THE COURT: No, no, let's just say --
9
                 MR. JOSEPHSON: -- because a lot of times it's just
10
       one.
11
                 THE COURT: Let me just -- let's say eight more
12
       people decide to join and nobody else does. So we've got,
13
       what, 11 guys. Now if that's what we've got, wouldn't we do
14
       complete individual discovery on each of those cases?
15
                 MR. BURCH:
                            Yes.
16
                 MR. JOSEPHSON: I think in that --
17
                 THE COURT: We would know. I mean, we would know.
18
                 MR. JOSEPHSON: -- in that situation we probably
19
       would, yes --
20
                 THE COURT: Yes, because let's say somebody, they
21
       don't want to opt in.
22
                 MR. JOSEPHSON: But that's a determination that's
23
       impossible for us to --
24
                 THE COURT: Well, but you said --
25
                 MR. JOSEPHSON: -- answer until the make up of the
```

1 class. 2 **THE COURT:** -- you said in none of these cases will 3 we ever get enough discovery in this --4 MR. JOSEPHSON: Well --5 THE COURT: -- but if we only get --MR. JOSEPHSON: -- but that's --6 7 THE COURT: -- a couple of people --8 MR. JOSEPHSON: -- but if we get 11 people, I'm 9 going to call up Mr. Brown and say, "Look, we want to amend 10 and make it an individual lawsuit where people are asserting 11 individual claims because the benefits of proceeding 12 collectively no longer exist." And that's, I mean, that's --13 THE COURT: Okay. 14 MR. JOSEPHSON: -- you know, the Court has to rely 15 on experienced wage lawyers to make a determination whether or 16 not it makes sense to have a collective action. And I think 17 if you're dealing with a handful of people, it may not make 18 sense. 19 THE COURT: Well --20 MR. JOSEPHSON: But it's hard for me to say. I can 21 tell you that in other cases I've certainly done that where I 22 only had a handful of people and it was a relatively small 23 class to begin with. THE COURT: Well, let me -- let's ask this then. 24 25 Let's say I'm the judge and we get eight people that opt in.

1 And then you say, "Well, Judge, we just want to decertify and 2 we want to try eight cases." I'd say I'm not trying eight of 3 these cases --4 MR. JOSEPHSON: Well --5 THE COURT: -- we're going to take this group and 6 we're going to try these eight guys --7 MR. JOSEPHSON: Fine. 8 THE COURT: -- and we're going to see if FLSA 9 applies to them or doesn't. Let's say we say it does. 10 other people -- what happens to the other people, do they all 11 of a sudden then get elevated to FLSA status because these 12 guys are going to get it and they didn't join the class? 13 MR. JOSEPHSON: No --14 THE COURT: I mean, is Kirby bound to do that? 15 MR. JOSEPHSON: No, I mean, this isn't a Rule 23 --THE COURT: Okay. 16 17 MR. JOSEPHSON: -- case. 18 THE COURT: Okay. 19 MR. JOSEPHSON: It's you self-select, you opt in, 20 you're only bound by the judgment if you opt into the case and 21 you're still there at the time it goes --22 THE COURT: All right. 23 -- to trial. If it gets MR. JOSEPHSON: 24 decertified, you go proceed individually. If you didn't do 25 anything, you sat on the sideline and watched, which a lot of

1 employees do --2 THE COURT: Sure. 3 MR. JOSEPHSON: -- it's just the nature of the 4 beast --5 THE COURT: Nothing was --6 MR. JOSEPHSON: -- there's no effect. 7 THE COURT: Nothing was --8 MR. JOSEPHSON: I mean, certainly it doesn't look 9 good --10 THE COURT: Yes. 11 MR. JOSEPHSON: -- and I can't say I wouldn't, you 12 know, if I were Kirby, think long and hard about whether or 13 not to continue that practice, but it doesn't have -- it's not 14 as if that is a determination on the merits as to non-15 participating, non-opt ins. 16 THE COURT: Okay. 17 MR. JOSEPHSON: Okay. And that's the beauty of the 18 216(b) provisions is that the concerns that a court has in a 19 Rule 23 context where everybody's bound by the judgment unless 20 they exclude themselves, don't exist because presumably people 21 are getting the notice and making a determination, that they 22 self-select to participate presumably because they've read the 23 notice or they've contacted the lawyers and asked questions 24 and taking into consideration all the information, they

decided, "Hey, this is appropriate for me and I want to

25

participate."

THE COURT: Do you think we should limit it to those who, in their own individual opinions, think they do at least 20 percent or more of their time tankering work?

MR. JOSEPHSON: I think it's -- I think that the notice adequately explains in very general terms what the lawsuit is about, and if you look at the pretty extensive body of law governing the types of communications with the class members, most courts have erred on the side of simplicity and not on the side of let's give these lay people a dissertation on what the law is and what the legal standards are --

THE COURT: It's not really a dissertation, it's just do you think you do 20 percent tankering work when you're on or not. There's nothing mysterious about that, or that doesn't take any -- but --

MR. JOSEPHSON: I think the idea is --

THE COURT: But if we just do tankermen, then we're going to -- then everybody's going to want to jump in because that's all there is on these boats, there are just tankermen. There's no deck hands, there's no nothing, there's just tankermen, so it's basically like if you're a tankerman, you probably should be getting overtime.

But the truth is, unless you're a tankerman who does 20 percent of your time tankering, as opposed to just riding along on the boat and tying it up and tying a knot,

1 then you're not. 2 MR. BROWN: Your Honor, you are correct for all the 3 reasons we've been discussing for about an hour. 4 THE COURT: Sorry about that. 5 MR. BROWN: This case does not lend itself to 6 conditional certification. There is no common policy, plan or 7 decision that violates the Fair Labor Standards Act. 8 THE COURT: Let me ask you this, suppose we do limit 9 it to 20 percent, let's say I say, "Okay, let's see what" --10 we'll worry about what qualifies and what doesn't during the 11 voyage and let's say we say, "Okay, anybody who thinks they do 12 at least 20 percent of actual tankering work," and supposed 13 800 people join. Then we've got a situation where we've got a 14 factual dispute I guess over what qualifies for tankering work 15 and what doesn't, we're not limited by the logs, that kind of 16 thing. 17 But we might have a whole bunch of people that 18 say, "Yes, we do," and wouldn't that be of some significance 19 if that's what the response is? 20 MR. BROWN: Well, I don't think that the fact that 21 somebody is called a tankerman, a vessel tankerman --22 THE COURT: Yes, I'm way past --23 MR. BROWN: -- is not determined yet. 24 THE COURT: I'm way past that.

Judicial Transcribers of Texas, Inc.

MR. BROWN: And so if we were to invite everybody

25

who thinks they spent --1 2 THE COURT: No, you're not --3 MR. BROWN: -- more than 20 percent of their 4 time --5 THE COURT: No, I'm saying --MR. BROWN: -- on tankering duties --6 7 THE COURT: No, I'm saying if you are a tankerman 8 who's worked in the last three years for Kirby, and we know on 9 the barges that's all they have, they don't have deck hands, 10 they don't have cooks, they don't have cleaning people, they 11 don't have engineers, they don't have anybody. They've got 12 two tankermen on the barges. 13 So all of them are going to be tankermen, 14 except for the captain I quess -- well, I quess he is, he's 15 qualified to be a tankerman already, isn't he? Because 16 he's --17 MR. BROWN: In some cases. 18 THE COURT: Yes, so I mean, once you get above 19 tankerman, you're a tankerman. So if we just were to say, "If 20 you were a tankerman for Kirby in the last three years, and 21 during your work history as a tankerman you performed more 22 than 20 percent of your time in actual tankering duties, then

Judicial Transcribers of Texas, Inc.

And then we get a whole bunch of people that

you can opt in to the this litigation." And that's basically

23

24

25

what we say.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

opt into it, then wouldn't that be indicative that this might be a good case to have certified if we put that limitation on it as opposed to just say, "Anybody's a tankerman, jump in, you might get a bunch of money." MR. BROWN: Well, I think that would be a better notice than the one that --THE COURT: Yes. MR. BROWN: -- just says, If you're a tankerman, you can sign up. THE COURT: But I mean, wouldn't that be some -wouldn't that be a future event that would make me say, "Well, I think I did the right thing because we've got enough interest because these people really do think that they do enough tankering work," and now I have to worry about the problem that we've got over here, and that is what qualifies for or doesn't qualify for tankering. And sooner or later I quess I need to make that decision, unless nobody joins the certification. MR. JOSEPHSON: Then your job would be really easy at that point MR. BROWN: Well, the interest in participating in the case --THE COURT: Yes.

Judicial Transcribers of Texas, Inc.

in determining whether to allow notice to go out.

MR. BROWN: -- is a factor the Court can consider

THE COURT: Right.

MR. BROWN: It's not determinative.

THE COURT: No.

MR. BROWN: And what would happen is you would get people that potentially could respond and say, "Well, I'm not really sure, but I'm going to be careful and I'll sign up." And so you're back to having an individualized assessment and going through and evaluating what this person did in their employment for Kirby.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. BROWN: And for that reason this isn't an appropriate case because it breaks down.

THE COURT: Well, it may break down. I mean, no question in my mind that it may break down. But I'm not so sure we can assume that it's going to break down if we try to limit the joinder to some sort of meaningful thing.

Which is why I asked right out of the gate,
What does this 20 percent really mean and who thinks it's of
significance, and obviously everybody thinks it's of some
significance. So does it make sense to just say, you know, if
that's what you do, come on? I mean, do you really think
somebody who says, "Yes, I'm a tankerman, but, heck, I haven't
been doing tankering work for the last three, four years, I
still want to join." I wouldn't think so.

MR. BROWN: I don't know what goes through their

minds.

THE COURT: Well, sure.

MR. BROWN: You know, I know that people say, "Oh, did you sign up, okay, I'll sign up, too."

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. BROWN: You know, I suspect that that happens.

And so I don't think that it would clearly resolve the issue.

And so I think you're back to what is the quality of the evidence before the Court today.

THE COURT: Well, can I really do that, because I don't have much evidence before me today, and I really can't just say, I will rely on what you tell me to rely on because that's what the logs say, we were only tankering here and only tankering there, if, in fact, other duties qualify for tankering work while the voyage is underway.

MR. BROWN: Well, even if someone doesn't like our math in reviewing the ship's log, we have very plain statements that there are vessels on which tankermen haven't done any loading or unloading in a year and a half.

THE COURT: Yes, and that's why I said wouldn't it make more sense to see how big this class might be if we limit it to those people who actually have -- are willing to say that -- and I don't know if they have to say it under oath or what, but I mean, they're willing to say, "No, I performed more than 20 percent of my time as tankerman."

MR. BROWN: And I think for all these concerns this is not the appropriate case to send out notice. I don't think that this is a case where you say, "Well, let's look at the job description," that'll -
THE COURT: No, I don't -
MR. BROWN: -- answer our case here.

THE COURT: I agree with you wholeheartedly there.

MR. BROWN: And because you have to go tankerman by tankerman, I don't think that this is a case where you say, well, they're all similarly situated -
THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BROWN: -- here's the common thread. The common thread can't be the job title because as we've

MR. BROWN: -- here's the common thread. The common thread can't be the job title because as we've discovered, the job title tells us that they do all kinds of things beyond tankering duties. And so I think that at this point Mr. Figgs and the people who have joined this case continue on and we pursue their claims --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BROWN: -- and we do discovery, we find out
what's there.

THE COURT: And I guess you just say Judge Atlas got it wrong when she decided tankermen that work for somebody — and she didn't even deal with the 20 percent rule that I could see. I thought I read through all that stuff and nobody was making that argument.

MR. BROWN: You know, it's interesting that Judge
Atlas, is that she said -- she didn't say that this was
automatically going to be conditionally certified, she said,
"Look at what Blessey did." They did not provide the type of
evidence to show a meaningful distinction between all these
tankermen. Okay. Well, let's look at the records, let's find
out what the records show that they did.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. BROWN: And that's how we came up with those numbers. So this is not the *Blessey* case.

THE COURT: No, I know it's not, but she nonetheless certified tankermen, and I assume *Blessey* has the same kind of operation as Kirby, in that they probably have two tankermen and two wheelhouse people on the boats, so she said --

MR. JOSEPHSON: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. JOSEPHSON: -- we disagree with Mr. Brown's --

THE COURT: Well, sure, I do, too.

MR. JOSEPHSON: -- assessment, of course. You know, I was just thinking to myself, having known John for a number of years, if there was ever a case that he thought it was appropriate for conditional certification, the answer is probably no, because what he's telling you is what every defense lawyer in courtrooms across the country tells the judge, and the fact of the matter -- and I think Judge Atlas

nailed it, and I think Judge Smith nailed it when he ruled in <u>ENG versus Maxim Healthcare Services</u>, one of the other opinions we attached -- the stuff that they're talking about doesn't defeat conditional certification.

If it did, the FLSA would have to be changed by Congress because there would never be an appropriate situation for class treatment of a wage violation.

THE COURT: No, I understand.

MR. JOSEPHSON: And these individuals would have to clog your docket filing individual claims, then you'd have to litigate the same case over and over and over again, and having done that, and having been decertified, I can tell you that judges hate it.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. JOSEPHSON: And looking forward, that's why courts allow conditional certification because it gives these people an opportunity to pool their resources, proceed collectively --

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. JOSEPHSON: -- based on a very limited showing.

And in this case the Court is not only, I think, been provided with more than enough evidence, but you actually have more evidence than Judge Atlas had in conditionally certifying the Coffin case against Blessey. But you've got documents from Kirby, statements from Kirby made in public filings and in

other places that support everything that we're asking you to do today, and validate everything that we're saying.

And if the law was such that a party had to come in and prove his case just to be able to notify similarly situated people, think of all the workers --

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. JOSEPHSON: -- that would lose money --

THE COURT: And I understand that.

MR. JOSEPHSON: -- for every week that they work
that they weren't notified about this case.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. JOSEPHSON: Or as Judge Atlas said I believe in Villatoro v Kimsone (phonetic), years ago, Mr. Burch's case, there's a lot of people that aren't going to join these lawsuits without the protective cloak of the Court. And while the notice isn't an endorsement, certainly getting something with the style of the case, with a -- that is a communication that's been blessed by the Court, is going to put people at ease that a company like Kirby, I'm not saying they would do this, or any other company, that they're not going to be retaliated against for coming forward.

THE COURT: But you've got to admit, this kind -these cases that involve these crews that just have tankermen,
I mean, you've got to be at least a tankerman to even get on
these barges it sounds like.

1 MR. JOSEPHSON: That's not true, Your Honor. 2 THE COURT: Well, it --3 MR. JOSEPHSON: I mean, why would they have a deck 4 hand training program if everybody was a tankerman? I mean, 5 how could you ever go work for this company if -- as a 6 greenhorn, someone that had never had a job before, if you 7 didn't have a tankerman license. I mean, this idea that every 8 one of their barges, these vessels pushing 30,000-barrel 9 barges with enough oil or chemical to destroy and environment, 10 that they are not going to be manned by deck hands, as well as 11 tankermen? 12 I mean, that -- I think that's insane to think 13 that -- and not to say you're insane, Your Honor --14 THE COURT: No, that's fine. 15 MR. JOSEPHSON: -- I think it's crazy to think that 16 they would have this deck hand training program if they --17 THE COURT: Do you know that that's true? 18 MR. JOSEPHSON: I do know it's true. I mean, they 19 say --20 THE COURT: No, no. No, no, I mean, do you know 21 that they have deck hands on the two men -- let's say they've 22 got two barges tied together going up and down the Mississippi 23 River, or wherever they go. Do you know whether they have 24 deck hands on board, or do they just accept guys that are 25 already qualified as tankermen to be crew members? Do you

1 know? MR. JOSEPHSON: I know that they say that the 3 typical career path --4 THE COURT: Right. 5 MR. JOSEPHSON: -- starts as a deck hand. 6 THE COURT: Right. 7 MR. JOSEPHSON: So, and they say that --8 THE COURT: But does that necessarily mean on the 9 barges? 10 -- in order to be admitted into MR. JOSEPHSON: 11 their tankermen trainee --12 THE COURT: Yes, but my question is, do they have 13 deck hands on these barges? Do you know? 14 MR. BURCH: Yes --15 THE COURT: Mr. Figgs ought to know. -- some of them, but not all. 16 MR. BURCH: 17 MR. JOSEPHSON: We know that some of them do and 18 some of them don't, but what we know, and I think this is the 19 most important thing, is it doesn't matter as long as we 20 follow the Fifth Circuit's guidance and look at the primary 21 purpose of the tankerman position. 22 THE COURT: Well, but then what does the 20 percent 23 rule mean? 24 MR. JOSEPHSON: Well, then I think we've solved, or 25 at least addressed some of the concerns by talking about

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

might today. Right?

THE COURT:

Yes.

including something in the notice that allows people that are self-selecting to make a determination whether they spent more than 20 percent of their time at a hitch performing tankerman duties. THE COURT: Okay. MR. JOSEPHSON: Or a week or however the parties agree to do it, but --THE COURT: Very well. MR. BURCH: And, Judge, we've applied the 20 percent rule in front of Judge Hoyt in a much, much larger collective action with Mr. Crow back here, a 1300-employee collective action where the 20 --**THE COURT:** Weren't tankermen though, were they? MR. BURCH: They were not, but it's the same 20 percent rule. THE COURT: Yes, sure. MR. BURCH: And obviously the guidance that was laid down in how you apply the 20 percent rule by the Fifth Circuit in Sea River Maritime was adopted by Judge Hoyt in Fluinsky v Luby's (phonetic). And he said, "Look, you know, that is a standard that sort of lends itself to collective treatment." And again, if we get to the second stage and the facts come out the way Your Honor is hypothesizing they

MR. BURCH: You have options. The Sixth Circuit -well, several circuits have now said, "Look, if you get to the
end and there are problems, there are some groups that you
think are in, some groups that you think are out, you have the
authority," and at least in the Sixth Circuit the obligation
to subclass. Right? And say, "Okay, well, here's a group of
folks that we can look at the captain's log for," you know,
just --

THE COURT: Whatever.

MR. BURCH: -- for one way of doing it. Right? We can look at the captain's log and see if these guys are like Mr. Figgs, who in his last year of employment most of the time, you know, more than half of the time was working more than 20 percent --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BURCH: -- on tankering duties.

THE COURT: Now what -- well, let's -- and I'm just curious, I've never tried one of these cases, and this had kind of got a unique factual scenario, so let's just -- let me just think that out.

MR. BURCH: Right.

THE COURT: Suppose we do decide we have to divide them into subclasses. These guys never -- these particular people who have joined would never qualify because they admittedly don't do enough.

MR. BURCH: Right.

THE COURT: These guys are close, you know, and these guys definitely get it. So we've got these different classes and these guys get it, so these guys don't, and so the only cases we try will be the people in the middle.

MR. BURCH: Could be.

THE COURT: Okay. And then what would keep Kirby from just saying, "Well, you know, you're next shift you're going out" -- you know, "you've been doing too much tankering work, so why don't you catch this barge next time and you catch that one and you catch that one?"

MR. BURCH: Well, but that's what --

THE COURT: What's the end result of the judgment?

Do they just get their back pay and we don't worry about what happens in the future, or is Kirby then obligated to pay these guys forever overtime whether they do the 20 percent rule or not, or what does the Court really accomplish other than giving them back pay if they cross over the threshold?

MR. BURCH: Well, I mean, that's not a small thing, Your Honor.

THE COURT: No, I know.

MR. BURCH: I mean, that --

THE COURT: But I mean, what's the end -- what does it make Kirby do other than settle up and worry about whether they're continue doing it that way or not, because now they

1 can manipulate it by moving these guys around? And even 2 though they're tankermen, we don't -- they're never going to 3 be on a ship where they do more than 20 percent of their time 4 over any given shift time. 5 Is it manipulating, or is it compliance? MR. BURCH: THE COURT: Well, that's what I'm saying --6 7 MR. BURCH: Because it seems to me --8 THE COURT: -- are they obligated to comply --9 MR. BURCH: Yes. THE COURT: -- or can they just assign these guys 10 11 like I guess they always can to the ships that they want them 12 to be on at any given time. 13 MR. JOSEPHSON: That's how those guys work. I mean, 14 most of them are assigned to the same vessel --15 THE COURT: Yes, but that's Kirby's decision, isn't 16 it? 17 MR. JOSEPHSON: Well, I think it's a lot of the 18 company --19 THE COURT: I'm sorry? 20 MR. JOSEPHSON: I was going to say from the 21 individuals that we represent from the other people that have 22 retained us for cases we haven't filed suit on, the majority 23 of them seem to work on the same vessel for an extended period 24 of time. It's not as if they are getting moved around --25 THE COURT: I understand.

1 MR. JOSEPHSON: -- week after week, but -- and I'm 2 sorry for interrupting you. 3 THE COURT: No. 4 MR. BURCH: I was just thinking, I mean, it seems to 5 me, yes, they are obligated to comply with the overtime 6 laws --7 THE COURT: Well --8 MR. BURCH: -- and if they want to take mitigating 9 factors by saying, "Okay, you know, this assistant manager who 10 we wouldn't let hire or fire and so we lost, we're now going 11 to give him the authority to hire and fire." Right? If they 12 want to change the position such that it --13 THE COURT: No, I'm not even saying that. 14 MR. BURCH: -- becomes exempt or non-exempt --15 THE COURT: They just want to change the assignment 16 so that they can make sure none of these guys qualify for 17 the -- if the 20 percent rule means what it means, that none 18 of these guys ever qualify for the 20 percent rule. So what 19 enforcement power do we have in the future of a judgment that 20 we entered in a case like this, given the uniqueness of these 21 tankermen positions on the Kirby barges? 22 MR. BURCH: Well --23 THE COURT: Do we worry about that, or not worry 24 about it? 25 MR. BURCH: -- I don't think we can, and believe

```
1
       me, I would love for there to be injunctive relief under the
2
       FLSA from private lawsuits, but there is not.
3
                 THE COURT: Okay. So --
4
                 MR. BURCH: And --
5
                 THE COURT: -- we solve this problem, but we don't
6
       necessarily mean that from here on out Kirby's going to have
7
       to pay overtime. It's only going to have to pay overtime if
8
       it allows its tankermen to work more than 20 percent.
9
                 MR. BURCH: Well, yes, if it violates the law --
10
                 THE COURT: That's money.
11
                 MR. BURCH: -- it has to pay overtime.
12
                 THE COURT: Sure.
13
                 MR. BURCH: That's right.
14
                 THE COURT: Okay.
15
                 MR. BURCH:
                            If it doesn't violate the law --
16
                 THE COURT: Very well.
17
                 MR. BURCH: -- then it doesn't have to pay
18
       overtime.
19
                 THE COURT: Okay.
20
                 MR. BURCH: So if we encourage them to comply with
21
       the law --
22
                 THE COURT:
                            Okay.
23
                                     Then, yes, we have accomplished
                 MR. BURCH: Right?
24
       a good thing.
25
                 THE COURT: Fair enough. So we get to one subclass
```

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

of guys, let's say 10 guys qualify for the subclass, they get their back pay, we have decided the middle class does and then these people don't. Then all Kirby would have to do theoretically is make sure these guys no longer work 20 percent of the time --MR. BURCH: Or pay overtime. THE COURT: Yes, or they just have to pay overtime --MR. BURCH: Right. THE COURT: -- but that's it. I mean, Kirby could just say, Okay, well, you know, the gigs up, you're just not going to work 20 percent of the time in overtime. You're a tankerman, great, we need tankermen, but we're not going to obligate ourselves to pay. They could do that and there's nothing this Court could do about it because of their past sins. MR. BURCH: But that's always true. Right? mean --THE COURT: Well, I mean --MR. BURCH: -- the fact that a position is nonexempt today, right, it doesn't mean you can't change the way the position works --THE COURT: No. MR. BURCH: -- change the job duties that it's

Judicial Transcribers of Texas, Inc.

performed and turn it into an exempt position.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

THE COURT: Yes, but let's say this is Walmart and we determine that Walmart's been cheating women all the time and now it has to pay women not only now, it's going to have to pay them overtime in the future --MR. BURCH: Right. THE COURT: -- without retaliating against them, that's a different kind of case than a case that has two tankermen on board a barge who may or may not qualify on any given voyage for the overtime. We don't worry about that? I mean, that's --MR. BURCH: Well, we --THE COURT: -- we can't force it down Kirby's throat. They could just say --MR. BURCH: But isn't it --THE COURT: -- all right, we've lost that one but we're not going to lose again. MR. BURCH: But aren't you saying that it's being -that they are changing as a result of that decision? THE COURT: Just changing their -- they're not changing their tankerman's description, they're not changing what he does, they're not changing anything, they're just changing --MR. BURCH: But they are changing --THE COURT: -- anything, they just changing his shift.

1 MR. BURCH: They are changing what he does. 2 THE COURT: They're just changing his shift. 3 They're just saying, you know, You're working too much as a 4 true tankerman, we need to put you on this barge that's 5 going -- that's taking a 21-day deal up the river so that all you have to do is these little bitty peripheral tankering 6 7 things that are never going to qualify for overtime. You're 8 just going to be a deck hand for the next 21 days till you hop 9 off in Minneapolis. 10 Right. So --MR. BURCH: 11 THE COURT: Then we're going to put you on it coming 12 back. I mean --13 MR. BURCH: So they are changing to comply. That's 14 the point though. Right? 15 THE COURT: Well, that's what I'm saying. 16 changing in order to avoid having to pay, but -- and there's 17 nothing we can do about that. Right? 18 MR. BURCH: I don't think so. 19 THE COURT: And maybe the answer is, yes --20 MR. BURCH: Right. 21 THE COURT: -- there's nothing you can do about it. 22 Kirby has the right to move its employees around any time it 23 wants to. 24 MR. BURCH: As long as it complies with the law. 25 THE COURT: That's what I'm saying.

MR. BURCH: Yes.

1

2 THE COURT: And there's nothing about compliance 3 with the law that says they can't reassign these guys to another vessel, is there? 4 5 MR. JOSEPHSON: No. 6 THE COURT: No. 7 MR. JOSEPHSON: I mean, they can do whatever they 8 deem to be appropriate, you know, subject to the Fair Labor 9 Standards Act and --10 THE COURT: And that's what I'm saying. 11 MR. JOSEPHSON: -- they're --12 THE COURT: So there's no future enforcement as a 13 result of this cause of action. 14 MR. JOSEPHSON: No, and we haven't -- we're not 15 seeking that. There's nothing that allows us to make such 16 a --17 THE COURT: Okay. 18 MR. JOSEPHSON: -- request of this Court. 19 THE COURT: So really it'd just be what they owe the 20 subclass of guys they can qualify. 21 MR. JOSEPHSON: The people that join --22 THE COURT: So we don't get a global application of 23 this to all the tankermen if we go the subclass route. It 24 could be we'll just have a few guys that qualify for overtime 25 and the rest don't.

```
1
                 MR. JOSEPHSON: It could be.
                 THE COURT: Okay.
3
                 MR. JOSEPHSON: It could be.
4
                 THE COURT: And they get it --
5
                 MR. JOSEPHSON: We won't know until the second
       stage, but it could be.
6
7
                 THE COURT: All right. Okay. All right. Well, I
8
       mean, that kind of answers my questions. You guys want to say
9
       anything else?
10
                 MR. BURCH: No, Your Honor.
11
                 MR. JOSEPHSON: I would like to say it's very nice
12
       that you had this hearing. In a lot of these cases the courts
13
       make determinations on the merits and it's always good to talk
14
       about --
15
                 THE COURT: Well, sure.
16
                 MR. JOSEPHSON: -- these issues on the front end
17
       so --
18
                 THE COURT: Absolutely. It's been fun though.
19
                 MR. JOSEPHSON: -- we appreciate that.
20
                 THE COURT: Yes.
21
                 MR. JOSEPHSON: On behalf of the clients, I don't
22
       think we have anything else to add.
23
                 THE COURT: Okay. Anything else you want to say?
24
                 MR. BROWN: You know, I just wanted to point out one
25
       thing.
```

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. BROWN: You mentioned earlier about Plaintiff's counsel that they didn't quite understand why Kirby was doing what it was with these vessel tankermen, and the practice has existed for decades.

THE COURT: Oh, I'm sure.

MR. BROWN: It goes all the way back to FLSA. If you look at the Sea River case, Kirby has divided up these tankering duties consistent with what the Plaintiff was going after. You know, in the Sea River case the Plaintiff didn't complain about his work as a tankerman or seaman tankerman, or even as an apprentice tankerman. He only complained that the seaman exemption did not apply to him when he was a member of a shore-based strike team, which was akin to Kirby's shore days tankermen.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. BROWN: So the practice is nothing new. And obviously that distinction is significant, because the shore days tankermen is spending all of their time, they're focused on loading and unloading.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. BROWN: Versus a vessel-based tankerman who lives on the vessel, works on the vessel, answers to the vessel's captain, and does all of the deck hand duties as we pointed out is consistent --

1 THE COURT: Right. 2 -- with the job description, so. MR. BROWN: 3 THE COURT: Yes, I understand that. But I'm 4 assuming you can see that if a tankerman were able to come 5 into court and prove that he -- 25 percent of his duties were 6 tankering and the Court believed that or a jury believed it or 7 whatever, then that person would qualify for overtime, wouldn't he? 8 9 MR. BROWN: No, I wouldn't agree with that. 10 THE COURT: Oh, you wouldn't? 11 MR. BROWN: Because I don't believe that --THE COURT: Okay. 12 13 MR. BROWN: -- we don't agree that loading and 14 unloading cargo is non-seamen's work. We've presented 15 evidence and --16 THE COURT: Yes, but that's wasn't -- my 17 hypothetical was I believe it, if in a non-jury case, I'm the 18 judge and I discern -- and I believed that 25 percent of what 19 they did was -- qualifies for tankering in my opinion, and I 20 reject your opinion about that, then would then qualify for 21 overtime? 22 Well, that would be consistent with the MR. BROWN: 23 regulation, that they would be on overtime. 24 THE COURT: That's what I mean. 25 MR. BROWN: But, you know, I guess as we said, we

1 disagree with the premise about --2 THE COURT: Right. 3 -- whether tankering is --MR. BROWN: 4 THE COURT: Oh, sure. 5 -- seamen's work or not. And I would MR. BROWN: 6 also say the Fifth Circuit said you can't apply that 20 7 percent rule in a mechanical fashion. 8 THE COURT: No, I know, but --9 MR. BROWN: You have to look at the position overall 10 that that employee has and how they do it. 11 THE COURT: That's why I used 25 percent. I'm just 12 going to boost it up a little bit. 13 (General laughter.) 14 THE COURT: But it might. I mean, if you lose on 15 your basic premise about what qualifies and what doesn't and 16 then the judge or the jury says, Yes, we think that's 17 tankering, then that becomes an issue down the line. 18 Somewhere there's a percentage of work that would qualify for 19 overtime, I would assume. 20 But, okay. What about these other motions? 21 I've got the motion to unseal that settlement. Do you really 22 care about that? 23 MR. JOSEPHSON: I do. I mean, I don't think there's 24 a legitimate basis to seal the --25 THE COURT: Well, didn't your guy agree to keep it

1 confidential? 2 MR. JOSEPHSON: Sorry, I didn't hear you? 3 THE COURT: Didn't your man agree to keep it 4 confidential when he signed it? 5 MR. JOSEPHSON: I think he agreed to keep it 6 confidential. 7 THE COURT: Yes. 8 MR. JOSEPHSON: I don't think that -- I think to me, 9 as a proponent of open files and not sealing documents --10 THE COURT: Okay. 11 MR. JOSEPHSON: -- I do not see the need to seal 12 it. 13 THE COURT: All right. 14 MR. JOSEPHSON: I would certainly not be opposed if 15 they wanted to redact the value of the settlement, but I don't 16 think it's appropriate to seal that. And I don't like to get 17 into the practice of agreeing to seal things --18 THE COURT: Okay. 19 MR. JOSEPHSON: -- that I don't think are --THE COURT: Okay. 20 21 -- supposed to be sealed. MR. JOSEPHSON: 22 THE COURT: All right. I'm going to keep it under 23 seal just because I don't think it matters. And if there's some reason I need to disclose it, just file a motion and I'll 24 25 think about it, but do you agree to keep it confidential? I

don't see any reason why it needs to be public record other than the fact it's under seal and potentially --

MR. JOSEPHSON: Sure.

THE COURT: -- public record.

And as far as the motion to strike is concerned, is there anything you want to say more about that? I mean, I've read it --

MR. BROWN: I think it's fairly -- I think
everything it says --

THE COURT: Okay. Yes, I think it's drafted in such a way that this guy is voicing opinions and there may not be much basis for some of them, but I don't think he's -- it's just flat -- he says, This is what I believe and so I'm going to deny the motion to strike.

And as far as certification, my inclination is I'm probably going to go ahead and grant the motion, but I do want it limited to some sort of a recitation of the percentage of amount of time these guys do, because I really think most people tend to be honest, and, you know, if they know they're not performing, I don't think they're going to jump in the class.

But if we're going to go with the 20 percent rule, which sounds like is a good starting point, then we'll just see how much of a reaction we get. But other than that, I didn't see -- do we need to discuss the other things that

you were talking about in your motion, like making sure you get a copy, like make sure we get a third party to do all this sort of stuff as opposed to the normal way where we just let the lawyers for the Plaintiffs send it out, that kind of thing?

MR. BROWN: I'll tell you, Your Honor, in my

MR. BROWN: I'll tell you, Your Honor, in my experience usually the Court has directed the attorneys to see if they can come up with an agreement --

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. BROWN: -- on the language and the process.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. BROWN: And I've had no discussion with

Plaintiff's counsel --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BROWN: -- about those. I'm glad to do that. If that's not going to occur, we would want to go through our objections to what they've proposed, but it's going to -- it sounds like what they've proposed is going to be modified anyway.

THE COURT: To some extent I think as far as who should opt into these classes and if you really don't qualify, then don't bother us. But as far as a third party getting involved in all this, I don't think I want the expense of that to be borne out by anybody.

And I'm not aware, but I've only done this in a

1 couple of cases, I'm not aware of ever seeing a notice where 2 the defense attorney also gets notice of the joinder or 3 anything like that. But that doesn't mean it doesn't happen. 4 I'm open to any kind of arguments that you need to make about 5 that if you can't come up with an agreement. 6 MR. JOSEPHSON: We certainly provide the Defendant 7 in every case with a copy of the consent form. It's filed 8 with the Court --9 THE COURT: Yes. 10 -- as well for all the world to see MR. JOSEPHSON: 11 what -- where I have trouble, and I'm happy to go through all 12 of Mr. Brown's objectives, I think we addressed them --13 THE COURT: Yes, you did. 14 MR. JOSEPHSON: -- really thoroughly in our 15 reply --16 THE COURT: You did. 17 MR. JOSEPHSON: -- so I don't want to take up too 18 much of your time. 19 THE COURT: My real concern about letting the 20 defense lawyer get too involved in the process is that these 21 people may become clients. 22 MR. JOSEPHSON: Well, that's our concern. 23 THE COURT: And for you to be talking with them, 24 even in advance for example of what is going to blossom into 25 attorney-client privilege, just causes me a little bit of

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

concern. Obviously they're going to call the Plaintiff's lawyers and say, you know, What's the deal, what's going on, how many other people are -- there's nothing I can do about that. But to actually list defense counsel on there as if you've got -- I don't want to be in a position where you as a defense lawyer are calling potential clients of the other side trying to dissuade them, and I don't think --MR. BROWN: That wouldn't happen. -- you would, but it sounds like that's THE COURT: potentially something that could be done, if we were to go along with what seems to be an unusual process of letting defense lawyers be too involved in all of this. I wouldn't have any problem with if the people are going to file a consent -- well, you're going to prepare those -- well, no, they actually sign it. MR. JOSEPHSON: They send it to us, Your Honor --THE COURT: Yes. MR. JOSEPHSON: -- and we would file it with the Court to stop the clock from running on their claim. THE COURT: Yes, and I've got no problem with them being obligated to send a copy to --It would be filed with the Court. MR. BROWN:

MR. JOSEPHSON: We ECF it and --

THE COURT: Okay.

1 MR. JOSEPHSON: -- provide --2 THE COURT: And if you trust each other to do that, 3 I mean, that's --4 MR. JOSEPHSON: Yes, that's --5 THE COURT: -- sure. 6 MR. JOSEPHSON: -- not a problem. 7 THE COURT: Okay. 8 MR. JOSEPHSON: And I mean, that -- I thought it was 9 inappropriate to have their name on it and I do think it leads 10 to some confusion and I think courts have been pretty 11 consistent in not permitting the defense lawyer --12 THE COURT: Yes, John. 13 MR. JOSEPHSON: -- to participate. 14 MR. BROWN: There are plenty of cases where courts 15 have put defense counsel's name on there. The one idea is to 16 let the potential Plaintiff know that the company is 17 represented by counsel, one. Two, that potential Plaintiff 18 obviously has a right to call me if they want. But if they 19 have made a decision, I'm going to choose to participate in 20 the case --21 THE COURT: Sure. 22 MR. BROWN: -- that's easy, you know, you put in 23 language that says, If you've decided to join the case, do not initiate communication with defense counsel. 24 25 THE COURT: That's fine. Yes, I've got no objection

to putting your name -- or the defense lawyers on there, I just want to make sure it's not --

MR. BROWN: I don't think we should put their phone number, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I'm sorry?

MR. BROWN: I said I don't think we should put their -- if you put their name, I don't think we should put their phone number. I mean, that runs afoul of the rules of professional conduct.

MR. JOSEPHSON: To give them the telephone number?

MR. BROWN: Absolutely.

MR. JOSEPHSON: No.

MR. BROWN: I mean, how can they ethically respond to any inquiry by any Plaintiff knowing that they represent someone that has severely adverse interest to that individual? I mean, that's why we don't put the name on it. I'll give you a great example, Your Honor, if you'll --

THE COURT: Well, let me just stop for just one second. But what if unknown to all of us there are a bunch of tankermen that say, Yes, I've heard about that lawsuit, what a crock that thing is, we don't do that kind of work, and if I can call Kirby's lawyer, I want to tell them that we don't do that kind of -- I mean, wouldn't -- there's nothing wrong with that, is there?

MR. JOSEPHSON: That's a dicey situation. I mean,

```
1
       they had -- remember they've had access to these people for
2
       quite some time.
3
                 THE COURT: All I'm saying is suppose that is the --
4
       I mean, just that's -- if just because if we don't put the
5
       phone number on but we'll put his name, it just means they're
6
       going to have to take the next step to find the phone
7
       number --
8
                 MR. JOSEPHSON: And I think --
9
                 THE COURT: -- if they wanted to call and talk --
10
       you know, never even thought --
11
                 MR. JOSEPHSON: Sure.
                 THE COURT: -- about joining the case, but wanted
12
13
       to talk to Kirby's lawyer.
14
                 MR. JOSEPHSON: I think, Your Honor, that it's wrong
15
       to include their information period.
16
                 THE COURT: Okay.
17
                 THE JOSEPHSON: I don't think it serves any purpose,
18
       it's not the practice in this district.
19
                 THE COURT: Well, John tells me that it does happen.
20
                 MR. JOSEPHSON: Well --
21
                 MR. BROWN: I would have say, in fact, it may have
22
       happened in the case that Mr. Josephson referenced earlier. I
23
       mean, I've been involved in several cases --
24
                 THE COURT: Okay.
25
                 MR. BROWN: -- where my name and contact
```

1 information went out. 2 THE COURT: All right. Here's what -- what I want 3 you do is try to agree on something --4 MR. JOSEPHSON: Sure. 5 THE COURT: -- and if you can't, then we'll worry 6 about it, but if -- but I will give you this much guidance, 7 first to the caption, the caption's fine with me. I'm not 8 going to take the caption off of it. It's a lawsuit, if they 9 join in it's a lawsuit, if they file a consent, it's going to 10 be the caption, that kind of thing. That'll stay. 11 As far as putting your name and phone number on 12 it, I don't care. I mean, I'll do it I'm convinced that it's 13 been done in the past, and if it's never been done, I won't do 14 it. But that's it. You know, so I mean, if you want to fight 15 over that, we come back down here, call or whatever, I'll make 16 a final decision. But I've got no objection to putting it on 17 there if it's been done with some regularity or whatever in 18 the past. 19 MR. BURCH: Judge, can we just talk about that for 20 one second? 21 THE COURT: Sure. 22 He's correct, Mr. Brown's correct. MR. BURCH: 23 There are some courts that have done it. 24 THE COURT: All right. 25 MR. BURCH: The courts here, meaning Southern

District of Texas, in my experience have not.

THE COURT: Have they refused to do it, or just not done it?

MR. BURCH: Yes. We, in fact, cite one of our cases, Castillo v Subway, Ala Carte Subway, where the judge says, Look, there's no basis in fact and law for that. And you obviously have a different view of it. Honestly, I think it's a discretionary call.

THE COURT: I'm sure it is, but --

MR. BURCH: So, you know --

THE COURT: I'm just -- I don't get the feeling anybody's sneaky in here today.

MR. JOSEPHSON: Well, basically if you decide the 20 percent rule, what do you mean by sneaky, you know?

THE COURT: Absolutely. I'm not offended by it is all I'm saying. So if you, in talking, it looks like it's been done and that kind of stuff, I'll probably let it get done. If there's some people around you that say, No, we're never going to do that, and we're the Fifth Circuit, or we're the Southern District and that's the way it's going to be, then, you know. But that's my feel on it one way or the other. I'm not worried too much about that.

And then of course I do want some sort of limitation on that 20 percent rule, but I think the rest of the stuff -- well, I don't remember what all the rest of that

```
1
       stuff was, but --
2
                 MR. BURCH: We have a 90-day notice period --
3
                 THE COURT:
                            Yes.
4
                 MR. BURCH: -- and they want I believe 45 days.
5
                 MR. BROWN: Yes, in fact, Judge Atlas in that
       Blessing case gave 45 days.
6
7
                 MR. BURCH: And our only concern about that is that
8
       this is a slightly larger case and -- I mean, I'd be happy to
9
       go with 60, if that will get it done.
10
                 THE COURT: Yes. Well, we do have guys that are out
11
       at sea --
12
                 MR. JOSEPHSON: They're off shore.
                 THE COURT: -- for two weeks at a time, aren't
13
14
       they?
15
                 MR. BURCH:
                            Right.
16
                 MR. BROWN: Yes, I mean, they --
17
                 THE COURT: There, again, maybe not out at sea, but
18
       they're on board ship.
19
                 MR. JOSEPHSON: -- they may do a 28-day or a 14-
20
       day --
21
                 THE COURT: Yes.
22
                                -- and some even stay out longer.
                 MR. JOSEPHSON:
23
                 THE COURT: So if we were to catch it -- well, let's
24
       just say it's two weeks, that's two -- two, four, six -- what,
25
       yes, that would give them two shifts on or two offs to get
```

```
1
       their mail and make a response, wouldn't it?
2
                 MR. BURCH: Well, I'm just looking at the boat days
3
       that they have for Mr. Figgs, and there are stretches where
       they've been out -- it looks like they've been out for 45
4
5
       days.
                 THE COURT:
                            Okay.
6
7
                 MR. BURCH: And so I just think -- I'm happy to do
8
       60 if that --
9
                 THE COURT:
                            Sure.
                 MR. BURCH: -- just gets it done.
10
11
                 THE COURT: That's fine. Nobody's out that long,
12
       are they, that you've seen or you're aware of?
13
                 MR. BURCH: We have clients have been out that long.
14
       I mean, I think it's pretty common.
15
                 MR. BROWN:
                            Not for Kirby.
16
                 THE COURT: No? I mean, I --
17
                 MR. BURCH: I can't get them to agree to anything.
18
                 THE COURT: I really don't care. I mean, if Kirby's
19
       people aren't out for more than let's say three weeks at a
20
       time, then that'll give them three weeks on shore to make a
21
       decision and get them mailed.
22
                 MR. BURCH: And then I think the only --
23
                 THE COURT: Are they --
24
                 MR. BROWN: Your Honor, if 60 days is --
25
                 THE COURT: Yes, I mean --
```

1 MR. BROWN: -- what their offer is, we'll agree to 2 that. 3 THE COURT: Yes. Okay. And if you find out that 4 sometimes they're on longer than that, then that's -- let me 5 know, but I'm assuming, from what -- I know this much, it 6 looks like they're on two, off two, on two, off two. And if 7 that's the case, 60 days gives them two shore leaves to take 8 care of their business before they go back out. And I'm sure 9 they'll be talking to one another once this goes out, so. 10 MR. BROWN: Can we go back for just a second --11 THE COURT: Sure. 12 -- on the style of the case? If we're MR. BROWN: 13 going to have the style of the case, I request there to be a 14 sentence in there that says, The Court's expressed no opinion 15 on the merits of the case. 16 THE COURT: Sure. 17 MR. BURCH: That's fine. 18 THE COURT: That's fine. That's fine. No, I mean, 19 I just don't think that's going to make everybody say, Ooh, 20 the Court's really mad at Kirby and we're going to get a lot 21 of money, and they're just saying, It's just a lawsuit, I can 22 jump in or I can't. 23 MR. JOSEPHSON: No, we can put that on there, it's 24 not a big deal.

Judicial Transcribers of Texas, Inc.

THE COURT:

Yes. Yes, see what you can do, just

25

work it out. If you've got any wrinkles that you really need my attention on, just call me. I'll be happy to rule on it.

MR. JOSEPHSON: And, Your Honor, the -- and I heard your earlier say that they had to give us the class list so that we can mail out the notice, and I thought I heard you say that, because that's the --

THE COURT: Well, I didn't say that, but I mean, how else -- what else are we going to do?

 $\mbox{MR. JOSEPHSON:} \mbox{ I've been accused of hearing things}$ that I want to hear --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. JOSEPHSON: -- so I apologize, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I don't remember saying -- I don't even think we've talked about what they're going to have to fork over in order to let you get the mailing list, but how -- what else can we do other than identify those people?

MR. BROWN: Well, in nearly ever one of the cases that I've been involved with, there's been a third party because they've been big cases, and we've agreed on a certain day to hand over the name, the last name, mailing address, and that third party -- there are lots of companies that do it. They take care of it, they notify everybody the day that it went out, if some of the letters bounce back because of bad addresses, they let everybody know, they run traces, they send it back out.

1 And the idea is that that protects the 2 integrity of the notice process so that we're not concerned, 3 well, how else got the mailing list and how is it being used, 4 and did you do -- how many letters did you send out and so 5 forth. And so that's why we would request a third party 6 involved. 7 MR. JOSEPHSON: Yes, we are sneaky I quess. 8 (General laughter.) 9 THE COURT: What if we just put it under some sort 10 of confidentiality order? 11 MR. JOSEPHSON: That's fine. 12 THE COURT: I'm just trying to avoid the expense of 13 a third party. 14 MR. JOSEPHSON: It's a key. 15 MR. BROWN: You know, if there is a protective order 16 or a confidentiality --17 THE COURT: Yes. 18 MR. BROWN: -- order, that's helpful. I think that 19 their request was -- also included telephone numbers. I don't 20 think telephone numbers should be included because there's no 21 reason. 22 THE COURT: Sure. I mean, my gut feeling is, yes, 23 that's probably right. 24 MR. JOSEPHSON: I'm not sure if we asked for it, but 25 if we did, that's --

```
1
                 THE COURT: But I don't mind doing it under a
       protective order or something like that --
3
                 MR. JOSEPHSON: Yes, or --
4
                 THE COURT: -- even once the time's up, you just
5
       have to return it.
6
                 MR. JOSEPHSON: That's -- well, that --
7
                 THE COURT: I mean, if they --
                 MR. JOSEPHSON: -- you're talking the case it up,
8
9
       it's one of those documents you give back to the Defendant.
10
                 THE COURT: That's what I meant --
11
                 MR. JOSEPHSON: Yes, yes.
12
                 THE COURT: -- but you --
13
                 MR. JOSEPHSON: That's --
14
                 THE COURT: -- wouldn't even have to hold it until
15
       the case was over, I wouldn't think.
16
                 MR. JOSEPHSON: That's fine.
17
                 THE COURT: If you get somebody who sends one in a
18
       little late, you're going to get it. But you don't need to
19
       still have their address.
20
                 MR. JOSEPHSON: No, no, we can put it under a
21
       protective order.
22
                 THE COURT:
                            Yes.
23
                 MR. JOSEPHSON: It's a little bit unusual, but --
24
                 THE COURT: Yes.
25
                 MR. JOSEPHSON: -- we're happy to --
```

1 THE COURT: I understand. MR. JOSEPHSON: -- accommodate --3 THE COURT: But that's an easy solution to otherwise 4 a long argument. 5 MR. JOSEPHSON: Yes. No, that's -- I agree with 6 that, Your Honor, and we can -- we'll --7 THE COURT: Okay. 8 MR. JOSEPHSON: -- work something out with Mr. 9 The only remaining issue is we requested permission to 10 send out the same notice -- what if we agree to a 60-day 11 notice period, 60 days into at our expense to the people to 12 find that subsequent mailings help because people lose things 13 in the mail or they think it's junk mail and the courts have 14 been permitting that in these kinds of cases, and I think we 15 addressed it. 16 THE COURT: I've never heard of it, but I've only 17 done two of them, so I don't know. 18 MR. JOSEPHSON: It's just, you know, it's the nature 19 of the beast and you're dealing with people that are a little 20 bit transient because they are off shore a lot, so they may 21 not go home, some of them may have their mail forwarded. 22 just found that subsequent mailings further the objectives of 23 the FLSA and ensure that people receive adequate notice. 24 And I think it's particularly important if

we're -- with this shortened notice period, that we provide

25

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

```
them with a subsequent mailing identical to the notice that we
sent out and consistent with whatever the parties' agreement
may be in terms of who gets access to the class list.
if -- you know, it's so important to notify these people or
risk them actually losing their claim and never being notified
of the lawsuit, they're a former employee and if they aren't
notified, there's not a lot that we can do to protect them.
               And again, I don't want to repeat what we said
in our motion, but this is a fairly common practice. I just
had a judge in Illinois agree to do it in a case against Sears
and Kmart just the other day for the same reasons that I'm
explaining to you and to further the purposes of the FLSA.
          THE COURT: So you would anticipate mailing one when
we say go, and then mailing one 30 days later?
          MR. JOSEPHSON: Yes, sir.
          MR. BURCH:
                     Yes.
          MR. BROWN: Your Honor, we don't think it's
necessary. I mean, it's one thing to send out notice --
          THE COURT:
                     Sure.
          MR. BROWN: -- you know --
          THE COURT: I don't think it's --
                     -- the Supreme Court --
          MR. BROWN:
          THE COURT:
                    -- necessary, but --
          MR. BROWN: -- has said, you know, you can't -- the
courts need to be careful so that there's no judicial
```

1 endorsement, you're not encouraging --2 THE COURT: Right. 3 -- people to sign up. So I think one MR. BROWN: 4 notice satisfies that. Of course if something bounced back, 5 you know, we're glad they can put a trace on it and redeliver 6 that one. For every case that Mr. Josephson cites, I mean, I 7 can think of a case recently, the last six months in the Northern District of Texas where a judge refused to send out 8 9 multiple mailings, or allowed that to happen. 10 I just think that you go from --11 THE COURT: Notice to solicit --12 MR. BROWN: -- a very simple notice procedure to an 13 advertising campaign. 14 THE COURT: Yes. 15 MR. JOSEPHSON: Oh, how about I give you your 16 defense lawyer's name on there if you'll give us the 17 subsequent mailing. How about that? 18 That's the spirit of compromise, Judge. You've 19 inspired me. 20 MR. BROWN: The 60 days, we compromised on that. 21 MR. JOSEPHSON: No, you didn't give me --22 THE COURT: No, I decided that. 23 (General laughter.) 24 THE COURT: I didn't hear any --25 MR. JOSEPHSON: He just got in town, he's already

taking credit for what you do, Judge.

THE COURT: I'm not offended by sending a second one out, but I -- oh, what the heck, sure. That's fine. I don't -- that's fine. So send it out originally and then 30 days down the line.

How long will it take, John, for you to produce that list pursuant to a protective order, whatever you want to call it, of the potential clients?

MR. BROWN: I don't know.

THE COURT: Okay.

 ${
m MR.~BROWN:}$ I would think -- my guess is that within two weeks we could have it all done.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BROWN: But I will look into that and contact
Plaintiff's counsel and give them --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BROWN: -- our best estimate.

THE COURT: For all purposes today I'll order it so that you've got at least that hanging there and you can tell the clients, you know, Yes, the Judge said do it and he's being a real jerk about it. But if you need more time, well, I'll give it to you, but at least we've got a deadline for it.

So two weeks -- today is, what, the 7th, I'll give you till the Friday of -- let's see, one, two -- that would be the 21st. I don't know if you're working on the

23rd, but I'll make it due by the 23rd, which is the Friday, so that's just a little more than two weeks.

MR. JOSEPHSON: And if we can get, Your Honor, 10 days from the receipt, and maybe I'm -- if it's okay, Your Honor, we asked for 10 days in our motion, but with the holidays if it's okay if we do 15 days from receipt of the names and addresses in electronic format we'll get the notice out and make sure then to notify Mr. Brown once it goes out so they can calculate deadlines.

THE COURT: I'll tell you what, let's -- I mean,
I'll do that if you want, but your motivated to get it in the
mail, I would think.

MR. JOSEPHSON: I am, and if he can get it to us earlier, I'd like to get it out. I'm just --

THE COURT: All I was going to say is rather than set the deadline, I'll just order that you notify us that --

MR. JOSEPHSON: Okay.

THE COURT: -- the first mailing has gone out --

MR. JOSEPHSON: That's fine.

THE COURT: -- and then that'll start it.

MR. JOSEPHSON: That's fine. And, Your Honor, I hate to address Mr. Brown, but I know I need to address the Court, the part about it being in electronic format, like Excel or Access, is that something that the Court will agree to? That's typically how we get it, because then you can run

```
1
       the labels and --
                 THE COURT: It's fine with me.
3
                 MR. JOSEPHSON: Okay.
                 THE COURT: I mean, if -- I'm not sure I
4
5
       completely -- you mean when you get it from --
6
                 MR. JOSEPHSON: The actual list as opposed to Mr.
7
       Brown -- I'm not saying he'll do this because he's sent me an
8
       Excel spreadsheet in another case -- but as opposed to getting
9
       a printout --
10
                 THE COURT: Gotcha.
11
                 MR. JOSEPHSON: -- of the names, the custom is here
12
       it is in electronic format.
13
                 MR. BROWN: That's what we would do.
14
                 THE COURT: Okay.
15
                 MR. JOSEPHSON: Okay.
16
                 THE COURT: All right.
17
                 MR. JOSEPHSON: Okay.
18
                 THE COURT: Okay. Anything else?
19
                 MR. BURCH: Not for the Plaintiffs, Your Honor.
20
                 THE COURT: So --
21
                 MR. BROWN: Well -- I'm sorry.
22
                 THE COURT:
                            Yes.
23
                 MR. BROWN: I have one remaining issue, and that had
24
       to do --
25
                 THE COURT:
                            Yes.
```

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. BROWN: -- with what if the notice would mention that there may be an obligation to participate in discovery and testify. And we would just ask for a simple sentence that says, you know, If you participate in the case, you may be called on to answer written questions, testify by deposition, or testify in court. THE COURT: Is it typically included, or is it just something you dreamed up that you thought --MR. BROWN: No, and I'll tell you ---- sounded neat? THE COURT: MR. BROWN: -- Your Honor, the fact of the matter is, on any of these issues there are cases going both ways. THE COURT: Sure. MR. BROWN: I mean, our idea is that when somebody is making a decision about whether to participate, they should understand that there may be a time when they're called to participate in discovery or testify. I just think that that's full disclosure for the potential Plaintiffs. THE COURT: You mean and it's opposed to one of these things like I get from American Express that somewhere in the future you might get a dollar because you've paid too much interest, but don't do anything, don't worry about it, that kind of thing? MR. BROWN: Well, the other --MR. JOSEPHSON: It's worse than that.

MR. BROWN: -- and sometimes in these cases it happens that somebody signs up and then they're selected to participate in discovery, and, you know, they don't. So we have to go through process. So I think it's better to tell somebody up front that there's a chance that you may be called upon to get into discovery.

THE COURT: I'll tell you what, I'm not going to say no, but you guys are going to try to get together and put something together, and if you'll let me know the exact language you want to put in there and -- because sooner or later I'm going to have to sign an order that says, This is the form of the notice that goes out. Right?

MR. JOSEPHSON: Sure. The issue that -- this is something that I feel real strong about, Your Honor --

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. JOSEPHSON: -- and there's some areas where we can be flexible. As I mentioned, when we were talking about the second stage in trial, I mean, nobody knows what the discovery is going to be. I mean, the case I had with Mr. Brown, he served 38 boxes of discovery, it was like 10,000 sets, and the Court I think ordered only 10 percent of the Plaintiffs to answer that discovery. And so you never know --

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. JOSEPHSON: -- what's going to happen, and my
experience is that those statements which misrepresent the law

and are I think a little bit misleading, they tend to chill participation, and I can't think of a proposal concerning someone's obligation to participate that I could ever agree to --

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. JOSEPHSON: -- because it's so inconsistent with so many standards that are out there, and there's really not a way to include something like that without including the counter-argument as well. And I'll give you an example.

There are lots of times where I've seen parties suggest that they give the Court -- to the class members an example of how their damages would be calculated. Now the Plaintiffs argue, Well, they need to know, kind of like what Mr. Brown said, what they're getting into so they can make an informed decision about how the damages may be calculated. Then the defense lawyer will say, Oh, no, no, no, they may not even get damages so it's impossible to include that language.

Well, it's the same thing here. You have plenty of cases where people don't do anything other than send their consent form in, and to say you're going to have to do this or you're going to have to do that, the only purpose it serves is to dissuade them from participating.

THE COURT: And that's why I said show me what you really want after you attempt to agree on something and I'll either say it --

MR. JOSEPHSON: Okay.

THE COURT: -- does that or it doesn't, or modify it, or refuse to put it in. But give it a shot. I'm not opposed completely to it, so see what you can get. If you can tinker with it so it's real neutral, and you tell me, We're not fighting over it, great. But if I have to make a decision, I'll take a look at the Defendant's proposal and say go with it.

How quickly do you think you'll be able to get together, talk about it, and come up with as close to the final form as you need to and need my assistance on any loose ends?

MR. BURCH: I feel like we ought to be able to submit something by 5:00 p.m. on Monday, I would think.

THE COURT: I'm just asking.

MR. JOSEPHSON: Yes, that's doable.

THE COURT: Okay. So what should I call that?

MR. JOSEPHSON: Proposed notice?

MR. BROWN: Submission of proposed notice.

THE COURT: Okay. Proposed notice. And if it's not agreed to, you can just submit it to me, because it won't be filed, you know, just email it and say, This is what I got, and if you want to, just highlight those areas that you've got a problem with. If there's really any case law you want me to read, I can, but then I'll set up a phone call as promptly as

1 I can. That'll be December 12. Right? 2 MR. JOSEPHSON: Yes, sir. 3 THE COURT: Okay. And if we need to talk, we can --4 I'll have Sheila set something up either Tuesday or Wednesday 5 morning, if you can be available for that. Or even December 6 12 itself if it gets in here before five o'clock. 7 MR. JOSEPHSON: Okay. 8 THE COURT: What else? Anything, while you're here? 9 You've got my undivided attention, if I can help out, let me 10 know. 11 MR. BURCH: I don't think we have anything else, 12 Your Honor. 13 MR. JOSEPHSON: Not for the Plaintiffs, Your Honor. 14 THE COURT: Okay. John? 15 MR. BROWN: Nothing further, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Good deal. I'll try to cobble 16 17 together whatever I did in an order and get it to you. And if 18 anything comes up, let me know. 19 MR. JOSEPHSON: Okay. 20 MR. BURCH: Do you want us to submit a proposed 21 order with our joint notice, just saying, you know, it's been 22 granted and here's a --23 THE COURT: Well, I'll do that today, and then I'll 24 just get the proposed notice. But if there's some magical 25 words that need to be in the order --

```
1
                 MR. BURCH: No, I'm just -- you've been kind enough
       to indulge us --
3
                 THE COURT: Oh, for heaven's sake.
4
                 MR. BURCH: -- for hours, I feel like I should --
5
                 THE COURT: No problem.
                 MR. BURCH:
                            -- do something for you.
6
7
                 THE COURT: No, that's fine.
8
            (General laughter.)
9
                 THE COURT: I'd rather get it done than wait on it.
10
       Now I can do that today, that'll be no problem. But it's just
11
       going to be sort of hitting the highlights and then, like I
12
       say, if there's anything more I need to do as far as an order
13
       that you need to have in this kind of a case, yes, then I'm
14
       going to rely on your expertise. But if it's just --
15
                 MR. BURCH: Okay.
16
                 THE COURT: -- a matter of regurgitating what
17
       I've -- what rulings I did today, I can do that.
18
                 MR. BURCH: Okay, Your Honor.
19
                 THE COURT: Okay. Good.
20
                 MR. BURCH: All right. Thank you, Judge.
21
                 MR. JOSEPHSON: Thank you.
22
                 MR. BURCH: May we be excused?
23
                 THE COURT: Sure. You bet.
24
                 MR. BURCH: Thank you.
25
                 THE COURT: Sorry it took so long.
```

```
1
             (The hearing concluded at 12:44 p.m.)
       * * * * *
2
       I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the
3
4
       electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the
5
       above-entitled matter.
6
       /s mhenry
7
8
       JUDICIAL TRANSCRIBERS OF TEXAS, INC.
9
       JTT INVOICE # 29573
10
       DATE: DECEMBER 29, 2011
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
```